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CONVENTIONAL TRAFFIC POLICING IN THE AGE
OF AUTOMATED DRIVING*
JORDAN BLAIR WOODS**
This Article offers a detailed portrait of the potentially negative systemic effects
of the growth of autonomous vehicles on racial and economic justice in traffic
enforcement and policing involving conventional, human-controlled vehicles. Its
contributions are both descriptive and normative. Descriptively, this Article
draws on multiple sources (transportation data, market research, and historical
evidence) to explain why the growth of autonomous vehicles could give rise to
new layers of problems involving pretextual traffic stops and aggressive traffic
policing against conventional, human-controlled vehicles. Most at risk are
Black, Latinx, and economically marginalized populations that are already
vulnerable to overpolicing and overcriminalization in today’s driving regime.
Normatively, this Article illustrates why values of policing fairness and equality
must be considered ex ante and embedded into the early design and development
of autonomous vehicles. Consistent with this idea, the analysis examines
possibilities for using law and policy to achieve racial and economic justice in
traffic enforcement in a mixed-traffic regime where autonomous and
conventional vehicles share the road. In so doing, this Article strengthens existing
calls for reimagining policing in the area of traffic enforcement and starts a new
conversation about the need for these reforms in the advent of autonomous
vehicles.
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INTRODUCTION
Traffic stops are a major source of racial and economic injustice in the
United States.1 A long line of scholarship discusses how police discretion in
traffic stop settings enables racial profiling on roads and highways.2 Moreover,
empirical literature shows that people of color are not only disproportionately
stopped, but also are disproportionately subjected to intrusive police activity
during traffic stops (for instance, being questioned, searched, arrested, and
subjected to force).3
1. See Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth
Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 130 (2017) (discussing racial injustices
during traffic stops); David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme
Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 545–46 (1997) (same); FRANK
R. BAUMGARTNER, DEREK A. EPP & KELSEY SHOUB, SUSPECT CITIZENS: WHAT 20 MILLION
TRAFFIC STOPS TELL US ABOUT POLICING AND RACE 25–26 (2018) (discussing how traffic stops
have disproportionately targeted and harmed poor communities).
2. See CHARLES R. EPP, DONALD P. HAIDER-MARKEL & STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY,
PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP, at xv–xvi (2014); Devon W.
Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 977 (2002); Carbado, supra note 1,
at 130; Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV.
1543, 1544 (2011); Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 427–28
(1997); Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the
Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 655 (2002); Harris, supra note 1, at 546; Kevin R. Johnson, Essay,
How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren
v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1039 (2010); Tracy
Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 333 (1998); David A. Sklansky, Traffic
Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 326–27;
Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
956, 974 (1999).
3. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 1, at 12; Emma Pierson, Camelia Simoiu, Jan
Overgoor, Sam Corbett-Davies, Daniel Jenson, Amy Shoemaker, Vignesh Ramachandran, Phoebe
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Our driving system, however, is on the verge of major change, and it is
uncertain whether racial and economic injustices that stem from traffic stops
will worsen.4 Several automotive manufacturers and high-tech companies are
raising and spending billions of dollars to develop autonomous vehicles (defined
in this Article to refer to highly automated or fully autonomous vehicles)5 for
Barhouty, Cheryl Phillips, Ravi Shroff & Sharad Goel, A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in
Police Stops Across the United States, 4 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 736, 738 (2020); Robin Shepard Engel
& Jennifer M. Calnon, Examining the Influence of Drivers’ Characteristics During Traffic Stops with Police:
Results from a National Survey, 21 JUST. Q. 49, 63 (2004); Wendy C. Regoeczi & Stephanie Kent, Race,
Poverty, and the Traffic Ticket Cycle: Exploring the Situational Context of the Application of Police Discretion,
37 POLICING 190, 192–93 (2014); Sunghoon Roh & Matthew Robinson, A Geographic Approach to Racial
Profiling: The Microanalysis and Macroanalysis of Racial Disparity in Traffic Stops, 12 POLICE Q. 137, 137
(2009); Stephen Rushin & Griffin Sims Edwards, An Empirical Assessment of Pretextual Traffic Stops and
Racial Profiling, 73 STAN. L. REV. 637, 725 (2021).
4. See Mustapha Harb, Amanda Stathopoulos, Yoram Shiftan & Joan L. Walker, What Do We
(Not) Know About Our Future with Automated Vehicles?, 123 TRANSP. RSCH. PART C 102948, Feb. 2021,
at 1, 2 (“Today’s automotive industry is witnessing unprecedented technological change. A study by
Intel (2017) projected that the automated vehicles (AV) industry will be worth $7 trillion by 2050.”);
Darja Topolšek, Dario Babić, Darko Babić & Tina Cvahte Ojsteršek, Factors Influencing the Purchase
Intention of Autonomous Cars, 12 SUSTAINABILITY 10303, Dec. 2020, at 1, 1 (“Technology in motor
vehicle manufacturing and performance is developing rapidly, focusing many of the latest innovations
on automatic self-driving or autonomous cars.”); see also Katherine Shaver, City Planners Eye SelfDriving Vehicles To Correct Mistakes of the 20th-Century Auto, WASH. POST (July 20, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2019/07/20/city-planners-eye-self-driving-vehiclescorrect-mistakes-th-century-auto/ [https://perma.cc/8RL9-JMMR (dark archive)] (describing that
with autonomous vehicles “[n]ot since the Model T replaced the horse and buggy have transportation
and cities faced such extensive transformation”).
5. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) has identified six levels
of vehicle automation based on the degree to which a vehicle can operate on its own without driver
engagement. See Automated Vehicles for Safety, NHTSA, https://www.nhtsa.gov/technology-innovation/
automated-vehicles-safety [https://perma.cc/5GW9-P8ZZ]. At Level 0 (“no automation”), the “driver
performs all driving tasks.” Id. At Level 1 (“driver assistance”), the “[v]ehicle is controlled by the driver,
but some driving assist features may be included in vehicle design.” Id. At Level 2 (“partial
automation”), the “[v]ehicle has combined automated functions, like acceleration and steering, but the
driver must remain engaged with the driving task and monitor the environment at all times.” Id. At
Level 3 (“conditional automation”), the “[d]river is a necessity, but is not required to monitor the
environment. The driver must be ready to take control of the vehicle at all times with notice.” Id. At
Level 4 (“high automation”), the “vehicle is capable of performing all driving functions under certain
conditions. The driver may have the option to control the vehicle.” Id. At Level 5 (“full automation”),
the “vehicle is capable of performing all functions under all conditions. The driver may have the option
to control the vehicle.” Id.
This Article uses the term “autonomous vehicle” to refer to vehicles with high-to-full automation
capabilities at Levels 4 or 5. Currently, vehicles with automated capabilities only up to Level 2 are
available on the market. Kenneth S. Abraham & Robert L. Rabin, Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer
Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, 105 VA. L. REV. 127, 131 (2019)
(“Currently, there are not even Level 3 vehicles available for sale.”); see also Kathleen Walch, Are All
Levels of Autonomous Vehicles Equally Safe?, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/cognitiveworld/2019/12/08/how-autonomous-vehicles-fit-into-our-ai-enabled-future/#2852eb165
df9 [https://perma.cc/5TFJ-8PMS (dark archive)] (describing vehicles with Level 2 autonomous
capabilities to include “Tesla Autopilot, Cadillac Super Cruise, Mercedes-Benz Drive Pilot, and Volvo
Pilot Assist”). Scholars and transportation experts have focused on the jump between Level 3
(“conditional automation”) and Level 4 (“high automation”) as having the most significant difference

100 N.C. L. REV. 327 (2022)

330

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

the marketplace.6 Over forty states have enacted legislation, introduced bills, or
initiated executive orders related to autonomous vehicles.7 With calls mounting
for the federal government to take a more active role in creating uniform
standards and protocols for autonomous vehicles,8 in January 2020, the U.S.
Department of Transportation released updated policies with new guiding
principles regarding autonomous vehicles.9 It more recently built upon those
principles to create a comprehensive plan intended to prepare for the
integration of automated driving technologies into the U.S. transportation
system.10

in overall responsibility for driving-related functions between the driver and vehicle. See Abraham &
Rabin, supra, at 149; Bryan Casey, Robot Ipsa Loquitur, 108 GEO. L.J. 225, 246 (2019).
6. Eliot Brown, Uber Clinches $1 Billion Investment in Self-Driving Car Unit, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
18, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-clinches-1-billion-investment-in-self-drivingcar-unit-11555635651 [https://perma.cc/C2VK-AUT3 (dark archive)]; Kori Hale, Amazon Speeds
Towards $1.2 Billion Self Driving Black-Led Car Company Zoox, FORBES (July 7, 2020, 8:16 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/korihale/2020/07/07/amazon-speeds-towards-12-billion-self-drivingblack-led-car-company-zoox/#330e3cd91741 [https://perma.cc/F2YC-Q64H (dark archive)]; Daisuke
Wakabayashi, Waymo Includes Outsiders in $2.25 Billion Investment Round, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/02/technology/waymo-outside-investors.html [https://perma.cc/E
HU9-2R84 (dark archive)]; see also Mark A. Geistfeld, The Regulatory Sweet Spot for Autonomous Vehicles,
53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 337, 341 (2018) [hereinafter Geistfeld, The Regulatory Sweet Spot for
Autonomous Vehicles] (“Autonomous or highly automated vehicle (‘HAV’) technology is quickly
improving, in part because manufacturers are ‘pouring billions of dollars’ into its development.”); Zia
Wadud, Fully Automated Vehicles: A Cost of Ownership Analysis To Inform Early Adoption, 101 TRANSP.
RSCH. PART A 163, 163 (2017) (“All the major mainstream vehicle manufacturers are known to have
an automated vehicle program.”).
7. See Autonomous Vehicles State Bill Tracking Database, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec.
8, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-legislative-database.aspx
[https://perma.cc/MQ2K-7JLE] (providing a searchable database of autonomous vehicle bills that have
been introduced in the fifty states and the District of Columbia); see also Geistfeld, The Regulatory Sweet
Spot for Autonomous Vehicles, supra note 6, at 339 (“[Autonomous vehicles] have hit a legislative sweet
spot in which the commercial benefits of developing a highly lucrative market involve a technology
that promises to make our roadways substantially safer.”).
8. Joan Claybrook & Shaun Kildare, Autonomous Vehicles: No Driver . . . No Regulation?, 361 SCI.
36, 36 (2018) (“Driverless cars are on the road with no federal regulation, and the public is paying the
price.”); Ashley Johnson, Congress Needs To Hit the Accelerator on Self-Driving Regulation,
INDUSTRYWEEK (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.industryweek.com/the-economy/article/21120385/
congress-needs-to-hit-the-accelerator-on-selfdriving-regulation [https://perma.cc/W6LL-A2TF].
9. See generally NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL & U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ENSURING
AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN AUTOMATED VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES: AUTOMATED VEHICLES 4.0
(2020), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/policy-initiatives/automated-vehicles
/360956/ensuringamericanleadershipav4.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CF8-DUS8] (providing regulatory
policies and other guidance for automated vehicles). The Automated Vehicle 4.0 plan establishes
federal principles that consist of three core interests: (1) protecting users and communities; (2)
promoting efficient markets; and (3) facilitating coordinated effects. Id. at 1.
10. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., AUTOMATED VEHICLES: COMPREHENSIVE
PLAN (2021), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2021-01/USDOT_AVCP.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/B572-Q3CQ] (providing a comprehensive plan for the integration of automated driving
technologies).
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Although predictions are complicated by many factors, several experts
predict that autonomous vehicles will become increasingly mainstream in the
upcoming decades.11 Some commentators claim that the COVID-19 pandemic
is spurring greater enthusiasm for autonomous vehicles and recent consumer
survey research lends support to this view.12 Major companies, including
Amazon, Walmart, and DoorDash, are already experimenting with self-driving
technology to expand pickup and delivery services.13
It is almost certain that when the technology is available for individual
consumers to purchase, autonomous vehicles will share the road with
conventional, human-controlled vehicles (“conventional vehicles”) for some

11. Tracy Hresko Pearl, Compensation at the Crossroads: Autonomous Vehicles & Alternative Victim
Compensation Schemes, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1827, 1839–40 (2019) (discussing expert predictions
that autonomous vehicles will become mainstream in the coming decades); Kurt Forsgren, Dhaval Shah
& David Lum, The Road Ahead for Autonomous Vehicles, S&P GLOBAL (May 14, 2018), https://www.
spglobal.com/en/research-insights/articles/the-road-ahead-for-autonomous-vehicles [https://perma.cc/
B3U7-B6XD] (estimating that autonomous vehicles will comprise between ten to fifty percent of
vehicle market sales by 2040); Press Release, IEEE, Expert Members of IEEE Identify Driverless Cars
As Most Viable Form of Intelligent Transportation, Dominating the Roadway by 2040 and Sparking
Dramatic Changes in Vehicular Travel (Sept. 5, 2012), https://www.ieee.org/about/news/2012/
5september-2-2012.html [https://perma.cc/48ES-EB6R] (anticipating that autonomous vehicles “will
account for up to 75 percent of cars on the road by the year 2040”); Prateek Bansal & Kara M.
Kockelman, Forecasting Americans’ Long-Term Adoption of Connected and Autonomous Vehicle Technologies,
95 TRANSP. RSCH. PART A 49, 49 (2017) (offering a pessimistic prediction that 24% and an optimistic
prediction that 87% of the U.S. vehicle fleet will be Level 4 autonomous vehicles by 2045). In addition
to personal autonomous vehicle ownership, experts predict that ride-sharing services and taxi-car
services will begin to use fleets of autonomous vehicles in the coming decades. See Chao Mao, Yulin
Liu & Zuo-Jun (Max) Shen, Dispatch of Autonomous Vehicles for Taxi Services: A Deep Reinforcement
Learning Approach, 115 TRANSP. RSCH. PART C 102626, Apr. 2020, at 1, 1 (“We believe that over the
coming decades, ride sharing companies such as Uber and Lyft may aggressively begin to use shared
fleets of electric and self-driving cars that could be summoned to pick up passengers and shuttle them
to offices and stores.”).
12. Jack R. Nerad, Pandemic Will Move Autonomous Vehicle Development Forward, J.D. Power
Says, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2020, 6:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacknerad2/2020/08/14/
pandemic-will-move-autonomous-vehicle-development-forward-jd-power-says/?sh=355182e328c0
[https://perma.cc/3QYD-2XUS (dark archive)]; 2020 Mobility Report, MOTIONAL (2020), https://
motional.com/mobilityreport/ [https://perma.cc/PZP3-D8TD] (presenting results from a survey of
1,000 Americans finding that 62% believe that “self-driving vehicles are the way to the future”). But see
Topolšek et al., supra note 4, at 13 (“Over the short to mid-term, the COVID-19 crisis could delay the
development of autonomous driving, due to the lack of investments and safety measures during the
pandemic.”).
13. Agence France-Presse, GM and DoorDash To Deliver Food with Self-Driving Cars,
INDUSTRYWEEK (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.industryweek.com/technology-and-iiot/article/2202
6938/gm-and-doordash-to-deliver-food-with-selfdriving-cars [https://perma.cc/X5T2-BW5L]; Jay
Greene & Faiz Siddiqui, Amazon Buys Self-Driving Car Firm Zoox, Suggesting a Future of Automated
Deliveries, WASH. POST (June 26, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/
26/amazon-zoom/ [https://perma.cc/6LHA-6XCL (dark archive)]; Tom Ward, Walmart Teams Up with
Cruise To Pilot All-Electric Self-Delivery Powered by 100% Renewable Energy, WALMART (Nov. 10, 2020),
https://corporate.walmart.com/newsroom/2020/11/10/walmart-teams-up-with-cruise-to-pilot-allelectric-self-driving-delivery-powered-by-100-renewable-energy [https://perma.cc/4AZ8-RS9G].

100 N.C. L. REV. 327 (2022)

332

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

period of time.14 Tort scholars have taken the lead in exploring how the growth
of autonomous vehicles will render traditional legal frameworks surrounding
traffic liability and insurance inadequate and are advancing new paradigms to
achieve tort policy objectives for when autonomous vehicles hit the road.15
Autonomous vehicles, however, will also have major consequences outside of
tort law, including for law enforcement and policing.16
To date, the issue of police-initiated traffic enforcement against
conventional vehicles in a mixed-traffic regime has not been a focus of legal
scholarship.17 Whether the growth of autonomous vehicles will exacerbate racial
and economic injustices in traffic enforcement and the policing of nontraffic
crime18 for drivers and passengers in conventional vehicles that remain on the
road is largely uncharted territory. This gap in the literature is concerning given
that it is unclear how long this mixed-traffic regime will last19 and traffic

14. Abraham & Rabin, supra note 5, at 131 (noting that the rollout of highly automated
autonomous vehicles “will not, in one fell swoop, obliterate the sale of ‘conventional’ vehicles”); Tariq
Usman Saeed, Mark W. Burris, Samuel Labi & Kumares C. Sinha, An Empirical Discourse on Forecasting
the Use of Autonomous Vehicles Using Consumers’ Preferences, 158 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE
120130, May 2020, at 1, 1 (describing that private ownership of vehicles will not be obsolete during the
“early phase of transitioning to the self-driving era (when roads are expected to contain vehicles with
and without human drivers”).
15. See Saeed et al., supra note 14, at 5; Casey, supra note 5, at 225; Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap
for Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort Liability, Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105
CALIF. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (2017) [hereinafter Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles]; Michael
I. Krauss, Freedom from Control, Freedom from Choice? How Will Tort Law Deal with Autonomous Vehicles,
25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 20, 22 (2017); Pearl, supra note 11, at 1854.
16. Thomas J. Cowper & Bernard H. Levin, Autonomous Vehicles: How Will They Challenge Law
Enforcement, FBI L. ENF’T BULL. (Feb. 13, 2018), https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featuredarticles/autonomous-vehicles-how-will-they-challenge-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/T294-SD
MN] (noting that the adoption of autonomous vehicles “has significant implications for law
enforcement”); Elizabeth E. Joh, Automated Seizures: Police Stops of Self-Driving Cars, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV.
ONLINE 113, 116 (2019) [hereinafter Joh, Automated Seizures] (“The widespread adoption of
autonomous cars will have an enormous impact on policing.”); Jordan Blair Woods, Autonomous Vehicles
and Police De-Escalation, 114 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 74, 76 (2019) (“All signs indicate . . . that
autonomous vehicles will have massive implications for law enforcement.”).
17. Joh, Automated Seizures, supra note 16, at 115 (“While there is growing interest in the general
regulation of autonomous vehicles, there remains little discussion about how policing will change when
people are no longer driving their cars.”); Woods, supra note 16, at 76 (noting that compared to tort
liability issues, “[m]uch less attention . . . is being paid to autonomous vehicles and policing”).
18. For simplicity, this Article refers to “policing” to describe policing of nontraffic crime during
traffic stops.
19. Abraham & Rabin, supra note 5, at 164 (describing the “period when both CVs [conventional
vehicles] and HAVs [highly automated vehicles] are on the road” as “decades-long”). Some experts
have argued that autonomous vehicles will fully replace conventional vehicles in the next few decades.
See, e.g., Ed Sappin, Will Self-Driving Cars End the Big Automakers?, FORBES (Apr. 13, 2018, 9:00
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesnycouncil/2018/04/13/will-self-drivingcars-end-the-bigautomakers/#7d4baa85356d [https://perma.cc/M7UV-E7DQ (dark archive)] (asserting that eventually
private car ownership will be a thing of the past).
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enforcement is a persistent source of race- and class-based injustice in the
United States.20
Filling this gap, this Article explores the police regulation of traffic in a
mixed-traffic regime and considers how law and policy can be used as tools to
achieve racial and economic justice in a mixed-traffic regime. The contributions
of this Article are both descriptive and normative. Descriptively, this Article
provides a detailed portrait of the potentially negative systemic effects that the
growth of autonomous vehicles could have on already existing race- and classbased injustices in traffic enforcement and policing against conventional
vehicles.
The descriptive argument is as follows: In a mixed-traffic regime in which
people own autonomous vehicles and police retain their current role in traffic
enforcement vis-à-vis conventional vehicles, police regulation of traffic is likely
to shift in ways that are more targeted against drivers and passengers in
conventional vehicles.21 With the ability to avoid committing traffic violations,
the growth of autonomous vehicles will naturally decrease the extent to which
autonomous vehicle occupants come into contact with the police through traffic
enforcement.22 At the same time, structural inequalities along the lines of race
and class will create barriers that inhibit the most overpoliced populations in
today’s driving regime from owning and accessing autonomous vehicles.23 Raceand class-based injustices surrounding which drivers and passengers in
conventional vehicles are stopped and subsequently questioned, frisked,
searched, cited, and arrested during traffic stops could worsen.24 In addition,
the growth of autonomous vehicles could give rise to new layers of problems
involving pretextual traffic stops25 and aggressive policing against drivers and
passengers in conventional vehicles that further harm people of color and other
marginalized communities already vulnerable to overpolicing and
overcriminalization in today’s driving regime.26
This Article draws on multiple sources (transportation data, market
research, and historical evidence) to identify three trends that lend support to
these points. First, available market research indicates that higher-educated and
20. See sources cited supra note 2.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Section II.B.
23. See infra Section I.B; David Bissell, Thomas Birtchnell, Anthony Elliott & Eric L. Hsu,
Autonomous Automobilities: The Social Impacts of Driverless Vehicles, 68 CURRENT SOCIO. 116, 123 (2018)
(“Just like previous mobility systems, access to this new technology is likely to be unevenly distributed
across classed and racial lines.”).
24. See infra Sections II.B–C.
25. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 199, 209 (2007) [hereinafter Joh, Discretionless Policing] (defining pretextual stops as “occasions
when the justification offered for the detention is legally sufficient, but is not the actual reason for the
stop”).
26. See infra Part II.
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higher-earning households will be the most likely initial consumers of
autonomous vehicles once the technology is available on the market and
becomes increasingly mainstream.27 Second, transportation data indicate that
lower-income households, and especially lower-income households of color, are
overrepresented among those who drive older vehicles that lack the newest
safety features and technology.28 Third, history demonstrates that major
changes in driving infrastructure (for instance, the construction of the interstate
highway system) can shift the spatial and geographic dimensions of policing in
racialized and class-determined ways.29
Normatively, this Article claims that although autonomous vehicles have
promise to produce vast social and economic benefits,30 the process of reaping
those benefits must unfold in a fair and equitable way.31 As scholars have
described, technology can be deployed in ways that reduce disparities and harms
for marginalized groups in some policing contexts, while exacerbating those
problems in other policing contexts.32 Rather than considering values of
policing equality and fairness from an ex post perspective, this Article argues
that these values should be considered ex ante and embedded into the early
design and development of autonomous vehicles.33
27. See infra Section I.B.
28. See infra Section I.B.
29. See infra Section I.C.
30. Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of Tort Liability, 86 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 42 (2018) (articulating several “revolutionary benefits” of autonomous vehicles);
SECURING AM.’S FUTURE ENERGY, AMERICA’S WORKFORCE AND THE SELF-DRIVING FUTURE:
REALIZING PRODUCTIVITY GAINS AND SPURRING ECONOMIC GROWTH 8 (2018), https://av
workforce.secureenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Americas-Workforce-and-the-Self-DrivingFuture_Realizing-Productivity-Gains-and-Spurring-Economic-Growth.pdf [https://perma.cc/YW8G
-MH73] (“Significant economic benefits from the widespread adoption of AVs [autonomous vehicles]
could lead to nearly $800 billion in annual social and economic benefits by 2050.”). But see Soheil
Sohrabi, Bahar Dadashova, Haneen Khreis, Ipek N. Sener & Johanna Zmud, Quantifying the Health and
Health Equity Impacts of Autonomous Vehicles: A Conceptual Framework and Literature Review, 22 J.
TRANSP. & HEALTH 101120, July 2021, at 1, 2 (“AV’s impacts cannot be estimated by empirical studies
yet because they are not operating freely on public roads.”).
31. Cf. Shane Epting, Automated Vehicles and Transportation Justice, 32 PHIL. & TECH. 389, 393
(2019) (“Perhaps the most pressing issue that has not received sufficient attention in the literature is
how AVs [autonomous vehicles] will affect vulnerable groups.”).
32. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1268–83
(2017) (discussing how technology can be harnessed to deracialize policing); Bennett Capers, Policing,
Technology, and Doctrinal Assists, 69 FLA. L. REV. 723, 759 (2017) (arguing that police use of technology
can play a role in addressing racial profiling); Andrew Ferguson, The Exclusionary Rule in the Age of Blue
Data, 72 VAND. L. REV. 561, 594–635 (2019) (examining how digital surveillance technologies “could
be used to address accountability problems of police violence, racial bias, and unconstitutional
practices”); Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, 13 SIGNIFICANCE 14, 19 (2016)
(discussing how predictive policing “reproduc[es] and magnif[ies]” biases in policing); Hannah BlochWehba, Visible Policing: Technology, Transparency, and Democratic Control, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 917 passim
(2021) (discussing how technology can erode transparency in policing).
33. This point is consistent with what has been labeled a “design for values” approach in ethics
and technology literature. See Taylor Stone, Filippo Santoni de Sio & Pieter E. Vermaas, Driving in
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Consistent with this idea, this Article explains that piecemeal
constitutional or statutory interventions that limit aspects of police authority
during traffic stops will be insufficient to tackle the structural ways in which
the growth of autonomous vehicles could exacerbate race- and class-based
injustices in traffic enforcement and policing against drivers and passengers in
conventional vehicles.34 Rather, deeper reforms will be needed that reorient the
role of police in the traffic space and that narrow relevant gaps which place
conventional vehicle occupants at greater risk of police contact through traffic
enforcement.35 Along these lines, this Article provides fresh support for
growing calls to remove police from routine traffic enforcement and aligns with
broader social movements to reimagine public safety and policing.36
Two caveats are useful at the outset. First, questions about the nature and
extent of police authority over autonomous vehicles and their occupants are
beyond the scope of this Article.37 It is possible that autonomous vehicles will
be policed in ways that differ from conventional vehicles, yet still engender
individual and social costs. For instance, the focus of policing autonomous
vehicles could shift away from traffic violation enforcement to using the data
from autonomous vehicles for surveillance and criminal investigation
purposes.38 These privacy concerns are important, but nonetheless different
from the main questions that are the focus of this Article involving the policing
of conventional vehicles that remain on the road in a mixed-traffic regime.

the Dark: Designing Autonomous Vehicles for Reducing Light Pollution, 26 SCI. & ENG’G ETHICS 387, 388–
89 (2020) (describing how a design-for-values approach “asserts that societal and moral values should
be proactively taken into account from the early stages of the design and development process, thus
embedding values into the technical system”); see also Bissell et al., supra note 23, at 121 (“Technologies
of transit can bear the cultural imprints of those who developed them and these imprints can be
involved in the creation or reproduction of asymmetrical power relations.”).
34. Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Police Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1, 1 (2009) (recognizing more generally that “[r]educing police misconduct requires substantial
institutional reform in our nation’s police departments”).
35. See infra Part III.
36. See infra Part III.
37. For a discussion of police stops on self-driving cars, see generally Joh, Discretionless Policing,
supra note 25. For a comprehensive discussion of surveillance issues in smart cities, see generally
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Structural Sensor Surveillance, 106 IOWA L. REV. 47 (2020).
38. See Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1171, 1196
(2012) (“Government agencies, including law enforcement and intelligence agencies, will seek to use
personal information from autonomous vehicles to find suspicious individuals for further investigation
or to prosecute suspects based on autonomous vehicle data.”); Brad Templeton, Will Networked SelfDriving Cars Become a Surveillance Nightmare?, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2019, 8:10 AM), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/bradtempleton/2019/08/29/well-networked-self-driving-cars-become-a-surveillancenightmare/?sh=4bdbb7c2612f [https://perma.cc/FF8D-Y4B2 (dark archive)] (discussing police
surveillance and self-driving cars); Woods, supra note 16, at 84 (discussing how the ability of
autonomous vehicles to record data could give rise to new forms of police surveillance and policing
strategies).
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Second, the analysis in this Article is not intended to argue that the
direction of autonomous vehicle technology and the subsequent regulation of
traffic will unfold monolithically within and across localities.39 The technology
is likely to be deployed in different and multiple ways in urban, suburban, and
rural spaces.40 Policing also differs within and across cities, suburbs, and rural
areas.41 Even if the growth of autonomous vehicles does not exacerbate raceand class-based injustices in traffic enforcement and policing during traffic
stops on conventional vehicles in all localities, it is vital to not lose sight of
where and how those negative systemic harms occur.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I draws on multiple sources,
including transportation research, market data, and historical evidence, to
examine trends in autonomous vehicle accessibility and demand. Building on
that analysis, Part II provides a detailed portrait of the potentially negative
systemic effects of autonomous vehicles on racial and economic justice
involving traffic enforcement and policing against drivers and passengers in
conventional vehicles. Part III then explores potential law and policy reforms
for achieving racial and economic justice in traffic enforcement and policing
involving conventional vehicles in a future mixed-traffic regime.

39. Experts have brainstormed at least three possible models of autonomous vehicle ownership in
the future. See Patrick M. Bösch, Felix Becker, Henrik Becker & Kay W. Axhausen, Cost-Based Analysis
of Autonomous Mobility Services, 64 TRANSP. POL’Y 76, 77 (2018). The first model is a personal ownership
model. Under this approach, individuals will own autonomous vehicles in the same way that individuals
own conventional, human-controlled vehicles today. Id. The second model is an on-demand model.
Under this approach, people will summon autonomous vehicles, similar to how taxis or Uber/Lyft
services are summoned today. Id. The third and final model is the car-sharing model. Under this
approach, a certain number of autonomous vehicles will be available for use in lots or garages that a
group of people would share and potentially collectively own. Id. Of course, it is possible that all three
ownership models could coexist in a particular region or locality. Which ownership models are available
in a particular locality could also change over time. See, e.g., GEORGE MARTIN, SUSTAINABILITY
PROSPECTS FOR AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES: ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND URBAN 120 (2020)
(“The consensus position among analysts is that autonomous vehicles will begin deployment in
fleets.”).
40. BARUCH FEIGENBAUM, REASON FOUND., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES: A GUIDE FOR
POLICYMAKERS 47 (2018), https://reason.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/autonomous-vehiclesguide-for-policymakers.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CNL-P96N] (“Autonomous vehicles will be adopted in
different ways in different areas. There are at least five major types of land uses: downtown, dense
development, campus zone, suburban and rural.”).
41. See RALPH A. WEISHEIT, DAVID N. FALCONE & L. EDWARD WELLS, CRIME AND
POLICING IN RURAL AND SMALL-TOWN AMERICA 188 (3d ed. 2006) (arguing that “rural and urban
policing are fundamentally different, particularly in the day-to-day details”); John P. Crank, The
Influence of Environmental and Organizational Factors on Police Style in Urban and Rural Environments, 27
J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 166, 166 (1990) (concluding based on the results of an empirical study
that “the organizational and environmental dynamics affecting police style vary, at times considerably,
between urban and rural departments”).
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I. AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE ACCESSIBILITY AND DEMAND
This part draws on evidence from multiple sources (including
transportation data, market research, and history) to argue that barriers along
the lines of race and class will inhibit the most overpoliced and marginalized
populations in today’s driving regime from initially owning and accessing
autonomous vehicles. To establish these points, Section I.A first discusses why
personal ownership is a likely model of autonomous vehicle ownership in the
future. Section I.B examines likely racial and economic gaps in autonomous
vehicle access and demand. Finally, Section I.C discusses potential spatial and
geographic consequences of autonomous vehicle growth. The next part of this
Article explores the implications of these points for traffic enforcement and
policing against conventional vehicles in a mixed-traffic regime.
A.

Autonomous Vehicles and Personal Ownership

Personal ownership is a very likely model of autonomous vehicle
ownership once the technology is available.42 To begin, there is a strong cultural
emphasis on car ownership in the United States.43 Owning a vehicle has
historically been, and still is, a symbol of freedom and success in the United
States.44
42. See Bösch et al., supra note 39, at 84 (describing private ownership of autonomous vehicle as
“an attractive option . . . as out-of-pocket costs for the user . . . are lower than for most other modes”);
Harb et al., supra note 4, at 2 (identifying personal ownership of autonomous vehicles as one of “[t]wo
main business models [that] are speculated to shape the future of transportation”); Wenwen Zhang,
Subhrajit Guhathakurta & Elias B. Khalil, The Impact of Private Autonomous Vehicles on Vehicle Ownership
and Unoccupied VMT Generation, 90 TRANSP. RSCH. PART C 156, 157 (2018) (“[T]he majority of
consumers may still prefer to own a private AV [autonomous vehicle] in the near future.”). This does
not deny the possibility that different ownership models could coexist in localities. See Bösch et al.,
supra note 39, at 77 (discussing personal ownership, on-demand, and car-sharing models of autonomous
vehicle ownership).
43. Birgitta Gatersleben, The Car as a Material Possession: Exploring the Link Between Materialism
and Car Ownership and Use, in AUTO MOTIVES: UNDERSTANDING CAR USE BEHAVIOURS 137, 139
(Karen Lucas, Evelyn Blumenberg & Rachel Weinberger eds., 2011) (“The private car . . . can have
strong symbolic appeal, because, through years of persistent media advertisement, it is commonly
understood and accepted as a symbol that denotes social status, confidence, power and competence.”);
Elizabeth Rosenthal, The End of Car Culture, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2013), https://www.nytimes.
com/2013/06/30/sunday-review/the-end-of-car-culture.html [https://perma.cc/4 L5W-KW82 (dark
archive)] (describing the United States as historically having “one of the world’s prime car cultures”).
44. Gatersleblen, supra note 43, at 139; JEFFREY E. NASH & JAMES M. CALONICO,
INSTITUTIONS IN MODERN SOCIETY: MEANINGS, FORMS, AND CHARACTER 192 (1993) (“[T]he car
remains a symbol of individual freedom and power.”). See generally Blaine A. Bromwell, A Symbol of
Modernity: Attitudes Toward the Automobile in Southern Cities in the 1920s, 24 AM. Q. 20 (1972) (discussing
the symbolic representation of the automobile in U.S. southern cities in the 1920s). It is important to
note, however, that some scholars have argued that self-driving cars could disrupt the traditional
relationship between identity and car ownership. See Sarah J. Fox, Planning for Density in a Driverless
World, 9 NE. U. L. REV. 151, 165–66 (2017) (“A reconceptualization of the human relationship to cars
may make it possible over time to encourage more efficient, less land-intensive forms of transportation
and help to eliminate reliance on personal ownership of vehicles altogether.”); JAMES M. RUBENSTEIN,
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Moreover, several manufacturers paving the way for autonomous vehicles
to become mainstream envision a future in which individuals can own selfdriving cars, especially in less densely populated areas.45 Fewer options and
potentially longer waiting times pose obstacles for on-demand and car-sharing
services to replace personal vehicles as the principal mode of transport in less
densely populated localities.46 For these reasons, personal ownership is a
practical model for making autonomous vehicles accessible and available in rural
and suburban areas that lack robust public transport systems.
B.

Racial and Economic Gaps in Autonomous Vehicle Access and Demand

Ownership and access to autonomous vehicles will likely be unevenly
distributed along the lines of race and class.47 Several experts predict that when
personally-owned autonomous vehicles are first available on the market, they
will be highly priced, and accessibility and demand will be similar to that of
luxury cars today.48 At some point, market competition will drive down
production and operational costs, making autonomous vehicles more affordable
to a greater segment of the general public.49 When this shift occurs, the

MAKING AND SELLING CARS: INNOVATION AND CHANGE IN THE U.S. AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
308 (2001) (noting that at the turn of the twentieth century, “[o]wning and operating a motor vehicle
became a matter of high social status in American culture”).
45. See, e.g., Paul Lienert, GM Sees Custom Designs, Personal Ownership for Self-Driving Cars,
REUTERS (May 10, 2018, 2:28 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-general-motors-selfdriving/
gm-sees-custom-designs-personal-ownership-for-self-driving-cars-idUSKBN1IB2T6 [https://perma.
cc/4TZZ-ZNL8] (quoting the General Motors’ vice president of global strategy stating that personallyowned self-driving cars will be “a big business in the future”); Elon Musk, Master Plan, Part Deux,
TESLA BLOG (July 20, 2016), https://www.tesla.com/blog/master-plan-part-deux [https://perma.cc/
62KW-LYVN] (describing how Tesla’s “shared fleet” business model is based on the idea that
customers can own autonomous vehicles).
46. See David Levinson, Climbing Mount Next: The Effects of Autonomous Vehicles on Society, 16
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 787, 802 (2015) (noting that on-demand autonomous vehicle services “will
work better in urban areas than rural areas, as the response time will be shorter and size and variety of
the nearby vehicle pool will be greater”).
47. Bissell et al., supra note 23, at 123.
48. See Dorothy Glancy, Autonomous and Automated and Connected Cars—Oh My! First Generation
Autonomous Cars in the Legal Ecosystem, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 619, 622 (2015) (“Some predict
that only wealthy early-adopters will choose autonomous cars, which initially are likely to be expensive
and few in number.”); Qi Luo, Romesh Saigal, Zhibin Chen & Yafeng Yin, Accelerating the Adoption of
Automated Vehicles by Subsidies: A Dynamic Games Approach, 129 TRANSP. RSCH. PART B 226, 237
(2019) (“AVs may be highly priced at the beginning so that the initial AV market potential is
restricted.”).
49. See Randal O’Toole, Policy Implications of Autonomous Vehicles, 758 CATO INST. POL’Y
ANALYSIS, Sept. 18, 2014, at 1, 4 (discussing various market factors that will pressure manufacturers to
sell autonomous cars at affordable rates).
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technology will first trickle down to higher-income households that can afford
the technology.50
Available market research shows that current enthusiasm and demand for
autonomous vehicles in the United States is strongest among higher-income
and higher-educated households.51 Experts have identified two factors to
explain these trends. First, higher-income earners have greater opportunity
costs of time,52 and therefore, will reap financial benefits from investing in timesaving means of transport, including autonomous vehicles.53 Second, higherincome and higher-educated earners are more likely to engage in “knowledge
work”54 that cuts across several professions (for instance, research and product
50. JONAH GAMBA, RADAR SIGNAL PROCESSING FOR AUTONOMOUS DRIVING 140 (2020)
(“In the beginning, driverless cars would likely be out of the price range of most ordinary people but
with mass production, prices will go down in the coming 20 years.”).
51. See, e.g., Prateek Bansal, Kara M. Kockelman & Amit Singh, Assessing Public Opinions of and
Interest in New Vehicle Technologies: An Austin Perspective, 67 TRANSP. RSCH. PART C, Feb. 2016, at 1,
13 (finding from one study that “high-income tech-savvy males, living in urban areas and having greater
crash experience have more interest in and a higher [willingness to pay]” for autonomous vehicles);
DANIEL HOWARD & DANIELLE DAI, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF SELF-DRIVING CARS: THE
CASE OF BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 18 (2013), https://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~djhoward/reports/
Report%20-%20Public%20Perceptions%20of%20Self%20Driving%20Cars.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2Y
M-2AFE] (finding from one survey that “[w]ealthier people are more likely to be interested in selfdriving cars than those with lower income”); Parvathy Vinod Sheela & Fred Mannering, The Effect of
Information on Changing Options Toward Autonomous Vehicle Adoption: An Exploratory Analysis, 14 INT’L
J. SUSTAINABLE TRANSP. 475, 482 (2020) (presenting study findings showing that “more highly
educated individuals (holding a bachelor’s degree or above), those having household incomes greater
than $100,000 per year, and those individuals whose recent vehicle purchase was a new vehicle had
higher probabilities of being likely or extremely likely to adopt autonomous vehicles”); BRANDON
SCHOETTLE & MICHAEL SIVAK, UNIV. OF MICH. TRANSP. RSCH. INST., A SURVEY OF PUBLIC
OPINION ABOUT AUTONOMOUS AND SELF-DRIVING VEHICLES IN THE U.S., THE U.K., AND
AUSTRALIA 21 (2014), https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/108384/103024.pdf?
sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/3X8U-D7KJ] (finding from one survey that “[h]igher
levels of education were associated with greater interest by respondents in having self-drivingtechnology on their vehicle, and being less likely to say that they would not ride in self-driving
vehicles”).
52. PHILIP MCCANN, MODERN URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS 124 (2d ed. 2013)
(“[P]eople who earn high wage incomes have a high opportunity cost of time, in that the opportunity
cost to these people of non-wage activity is high.”).
53. Edward L. Glaeser & Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto, The Political Economy of Transportation
Investment, 13 ECON. TRANSP. 4, 8 (2018) (“[T]he opportunity cost of time spent travelling is
proportional to income, so higher incomes increase the benefit of infrastructure investments that reduce
travel times.”); Ralph McLaughlin, How Driverless Cars Could Drive Even Deeper Economic Inequality,
FAST CO. (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40490471/how-driverless-cars-could-driveeven-deeper-economic-inequality [https://perma.cc/WVW8-W3U3] (noting that because of higher
opportunity cost of time, “higher income consumers stand to reap greater financial benefits from
adopting time-saving modes of transport, such as driverless cars”).
54. SUE NEWELL, MAXINE ROBERTSON, HARRY SCARBROUGH & JACKY SWAN, MANAGING
KNOWLEDGE WORK AND INNOVATION 24 (2d ed. 2009) (describing that in knowledge work,
“knowledge acts as the main input into the work, the major way of achieving the work, and the major
output”); id. (noting that knowledge work “is traditionally referred to as professional work (e.g.,
accountancy, scientific and legal work) and more contemporary types of work (e.g., consultancy,
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development, architecture, advertising, education, and professional services in
law, finance, or consulting).55 In following the rules of the road, autonomous
vehicles will increase productivity for knowledge workers by transforming
commute time into potential work time.56
Current trends in conventional vehicle ownership and access lend
additional support to the idea that lower-income households will be least likely
to reap the benefits of autonomous vehicles. Research shows that personal
vehicle owners from lower-income households are more likely to own older
vehicles that lack advanced safety features.57 Lower-income individuals are also
more likely to drive vehicle models that fail inspections at higher average rates
and drive vehicles that have problems serious enough to fail vehicle
inspections.58 These trends suggest that the high cost of autonomous vehicles
will pose a major barrier to their adoption in lower-income communities and
households.59
In addition, many lower-income people live in car-dependent areas
without robust public transportation systems, especially in suburban and rural
regions.60 In those localities, car accessibility is essential to get to work and
software development, advertising and public relations)”). Some scholars warn against defining
knowledge work “in terms solely of high-skill occupations” and have examined the impact of knowledge
work on all industries and professions. See, e.g., BILL LAFAYETTE, WAYNE CURTIS, DENISE
BEDFORD & SEEMA IYER, KNOWLEDGE ECONOMIES AND KNOWLEDGE WORK 5 (2019).
55. NEWELL ET AL., supra note 54, at 24 (“Knowledge workers typically have high levels of
education and specialist skills combined with the ability to apply these skills in practice to identify and
solve problems.”).
56. McLaughlin, supra note 53; see also Topolšek et al., supra note 4, at 1 (noting that autonomous
cars “are also predicted to improve productivity because they will enable people to focus their attention
on things other than driving”).
57. ROLF PENDALL, EVELYN BLUMENBERG & CASEY DAWKINS, URB. INST., WHAT IF
CITIES COMBINED CAR-BASED SOLUTIONS WITH TRANSIT TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO
OPPORTUNITY 2 (2016), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/81571/2000818-Whatif-Cities-Combined-Car-Based-Solutions-with-Transit-to-Improve-Access-to-Opportunity.pdf [https
://perma.cc/V3BU-NWB6] (“Low-income households also tend to own older vehicles that often break
down.”); Ashley Nunes & Kristen Hernandez, The Cost of Self-Driving Cars Will Be the Biggest Barrier to
Their Adoption, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 31, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/01/the-cost-of-self-driving-carswill-be-the-biggest-barrier-to-their-adoption [https://perma.cc/C55V-XZK8] (noting how lower
income individuals “are more likely to . . . own older vehicles that lack advanced safety failures”).
58. See, e.g., Ryan J. Wessel, Policing the Poor: The Impact of Vehicle Emissions Inspection Programs
Across Income, 78 TRANSP. RSCH. PART D 102207, 2020, at 1, 1; Nunes & Hernandez, supra note 57
(noting how lower income individuals “are more likely to . . . own older vehicles that . . . have lower
crash-test ratings”).
59. See Nunes & Hernandez, supra note 57 (discussing how the likely cost of autonomous vehicles
raises questions about whether lower income individuals will have access to the technology since they
are more likely to own older vehicles with lower crash-test ratings).
60. Dennis M. Brown & Eileen S. Stommes, Rural Governments Face Public Transportation
Challenges and Opportunities, 2 AMBER WAVES, Feb. 2004, at 11, 11 (“Public transportation serves about
60 percent of all rural counties, including 28 percent with limited service.”). Research shows, however,
that low-income people and people of color are overrepresented in those who use public transportation
in larger metropolitan areas. See Sarah Schindler, Architectural Exclusion: Discrimination and Segregation
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obtain vital goods and services.61 Although lower-income households and
especially lower-income households of color are overrepresented among
individuals who lack personal vehicle access,62 research shows that in the past
few decades, there has been a surge in levels of personal vehicle access and
ownership in both groups.63 Most low-income people in the United States
currently live in households with vehicles.64
C.

Spatial and Geographic Consequences of Autonomous Vehicle Growth

The growth of autonomous vehicles could have spatial and geographic
consequences that further entrench race- and class-based divisions within and
across localities. History illustrates how major changes in driving infrastructure
can enable new migration patterns in racialized and class-determined ways.65
A prime example involves the surge of white suburbanization (“white
flight”) with the establishment of the interstate highway system in the decades
after World War II.66 In the 1950s, federal subsidization of new highways and
Through Physical Design of the Built Environment, 124 YALE L.J. 1934, 1961 (2015) (“[I]n larger
metropolitan areas, low-income people and people of color often rely more heavily on public
transportation than people from other groups.”).
61. Kelly L. Fleming, Social Equity Considerations in the New Age of Transportation: Electric,
Automated, and Shared Mobility, 13 J. SCI. POL’Y & GOVERNANCE, Oct. 2018, at 1, 2 (“Low-income
families, which are disproportionately people of color, people with disabilities, and rural populations,
without access to reliable transportation face increased barriers to basic necessities to succeed in the
US, propagating cycles of inequity.”).
62. See Brown & Stommes, supra note 60, at 11 (“Poor rural households are three times more
likely than nonpoor rural households to be without a vehicle.”); Nicholas J. Klein & Michael J. Smart,
Car Today, Gone Tomorrow: The Ephemeral Car in Low-Income, Immigrant and Minority Families, 44
TRANSP. 495, 501 (2017) (“[W]e find what prior research has shown: poor, foreign born and non-white
families are all considerably less likely to have an automobile than non-poor, US-born, or white
families.”).
63. Evelyn Blumenberg, Social Equity and Urban Transportation, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF URBAN
TRANSPORTATION 334 (Genevieve Giuliano & Susan Hanson eds., 4th ed. 2017) (“As of 2014, 95%
of all adults [in the United States] lived in households with at least one automobile. Nearly 80% of lowincome adults now live in households with vehicles, and increase from over 50% in 1960.”).
64. Id.
65. Robert D. Bullard, Introduction to HIGHWAY ROBBERY: TRANSPORTATION RACISM & NEW
ROUTES TO EQUITY 1, 4 (Robert D. Bullard, Glenn S. Johnson & Angel O. Torres eds., 2004) (“The
disparity of fruits borne by various transportation development projects is a grim story of a stolen
harvest with disproportionate burdens and costs paid for in diminished health and life opportunities
by poor people and people of color.”); Robert D. Bullard, The Anatomy of Transportation Racism, in
HIGHWAY ROBBERY: TRANSPORTATION RACISM & NEW ROUTES TO EQUITY, supra, at 15, 19; see
also Deborah N. Archer, Transportation Policy and the Underdevelopment of Black Communities, 106 IOWA
L. REV. 2125, 2127 (2021) (“The nation’s transportation system, like other American systems, has been
deployed to maximize the oppression of Black America while accelerating the accumulation of political
and economic power in white communities.”).
66. See Nathaniel Baum-Snow, Did Highways Cause Suburbanization?, 122 Q.J. ECON. 775, 775
(2007) (arguing that the “construction of new limited access highways” contributed to increased
suburbanization between 1950 and 1990); Deborah N. Archer, “White Men’s Roads Through Black Men’s
Homes”: Advancing Racial Equity Through Highway Reconstruction, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1273–85
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the construction of single-family homes facilitated a burst of white expansion
into the suburbs.67 The federal government commonly denied black families and
individuals loans to buy homes in the suburbs and racially restrictive covenants
further entrenched racial segregation.68 Simultaneously, the federal government
cut funding for the improvement and construction of homes and housing units
in urban areas where new nonwhite immigrants resided and nonwhite majority
populations remained.69 In turn, industry, wealth, and job opportunity moved
from declining urban neighborhoods to the suburbs as well.70
Sociologists and demographers are calling attention to a new type of
migration that is taking hold across the United States in which nonwhite
families and individuals are increasingly leaving urban neighborhoods with
historically nonwhite majority populations for the suburbs and other localities
with white majority populations.71 Rather than migrating to cities, new
immigrants (and non-European immigrants of color in particular) are also
increasingly migrating directly to the suburbs and other areas with white
majority populations.72 Data shows that in reaction, white families and
individuals are leaving those areas at increasing rates and choosing to selfsegregate in different isolated communities in what cultural critic and
anthropologist Rich Benjamin describes as “Whitopias.”73 In lowering the time

(2020) (describing how the development of the interstate highway system destroyed or isolated black
communities).
67. Robert J. Antonio & Alessandro Bonanno, A New Global Capitalism?: From “Americanism and
Fordism” to “Americanization-Globalization,” 41 AM. STUD. 33, 36 (2000) (“Explosive growth of
federally subsidized suburbs (single-family homes and highway systems) and of the standard middleclass consumer package (e.g., autos and home appliances) forged a new mass consumer society.”);
Clayton Nall, The Political Consequences of Spatial Policies: How Interstate Highways Facilitated Geographic
Polarization, 77 J. POL. 394, 395 (2015) (“Highways . . . enabl[ed] whites and middle- and upper-class
citizens to move from declining cities into single family residential neighborhoods along suburban
freeways.”).
68. Archer, supra note 66, at 1288–89 (“The federal government denied home loans to Black
people looking to live in white suburban communities, and racially restrictive covenants prevented
some homeowners from selling their homes to Black people.”).
69. William H. Frey, Black In-Migration, White Flight, and the Changing Economic Base of the Central
City, 85 AM. J. SOCIO. 1396, 1397 (1980) (describing nonwhite immigration and residential trends in
urban areas after World War II); MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR
ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE 134–35 (1989) (describing funding cuts).
70. Baum-Snow, supra note 66, at 801 (describing how new interstate highways allowed firms to
move to the suburbs between 1950 and 1990).
71. Karyn Lacy, The New Sociology of the Suburbs: A Research Agenda for Analysis of Emerging Trends,
42 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 369, 370 (2016) (“In the last three decades, the population of poor people,
immigrants, and blacks living in the suburbs have all increased dramatically.”).
72. Id. at 374 (describing recent suburban residential trends involving U.S. immigrants).
73. RICH BENJAMIN, SEARCHING FOR WHITOPIA: AN IMPROBABLE JOURNEY TO THE HEART
OF WHITE AMERICA 5 (2009); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Policing the Boundaries of Whiteness: The
Tragedy of Being “Out of Place” from Emmett Till to Trayvon Martin, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1113, 1154–57
(2017) (describing recent research on white residential self-segregation).
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costs of commuting, some experts warn that autonomous vehicles could add fuel
to the fire and drive society’s expansion into the “exburbs.”74
Physical changes to highways and roads with the growth of autonomous
vehicles could enable these new migration patterns.75 Researchers and
commentators have discussed how investing in “smart” streets and highways
that communicate with autonomous vehicles would optimize traffic flow and
safety.76 Some engineers are proposing models in which governments build
sensors into existing driving infrastructure that allow autonomous vehicles to
drive on the same highways and roads as conventional vehicles, likely in
separate lanes.77 For instance, in August 2020, policymakers in Michigan
announced plans to redesign a forty-mile stretch of highway and roads between
Detroit and Ann Arbor that would reserve a dedicated lane for self-driving
vehicles.78 Other engineers, however, are proposing models that would create
exclusive highways and roads for autonomous vehicles.79 Consistent with this
idea, a major venture capitalist group recently proposed limiting driving on

74. McLaughlin, supra note 53; Yonah Freemark, Anne Hudson & Jinhua Zhao, Are Cities
Prepared for Autonomous Vehicles? Planning for Technological Change by U.S. Local Governments, 85 J. AM.
PLAN. ASS’N 133, 134 (2019) (“The willingness of some [autonomous vehicle] commuters to travel
further, for example, could encourage sprawl and, in the process, increase . . . income-based
segregation.”).
75. Cf. Abdellah Chehri & Hussein T. Mouftah, Autonomous Vehicles in the Sustainable Cities, the
Beginning of a Green Adventure, 51 SUSTAINABLE CITIES & SOC’Y 101751, Aug. 2019, at 1, 3 (“A
modernization of highways and roads will undoubtedly accompany vehicular automation.”).
76. See, e.g., Chuck Harrington, Why the Future of Driving Needs Smart Infrastructure, PARSONS
(Jan. 26, 2020), https://www.parsons.com/2020/01/why-the-future-of-driving-needs-smart-infra
structure/ [https://perma.cc/7S48-XZ2W].
77. See, e.g., Mahyar Amirgholy, Mehrdad Shahabi & H. Oliver Gao, Traffic Automation and Lane
Management for Communicant, Autonomous, and Human-Driven Vehicles, 111 TRANSP. RSCH. PART C
477, 478 (2020) (proposing a three-lane system with different levels of automation technology to
optimize traffic flow for when conventional and autonomous vehicles share the road); Mahyar
Amirgholy, Mehdi Nourinejad & H. Oliver Gao, Optimal Traffic Control at Smart Intersections:
Automated Network Fundamental Diagram, 137 TRANSP. RSCH. PART B 2, 3 (2020) (“[W]e propose a
cooperative traffic control strategy for smart intersections to reduce congestion in urban networks.”);
Eduardo Felipe Zamborn Santana, Gustavo Covas, Fábio Duarte, Paolo Santi, Carlo Ratti & Fabio
Kon, Transitioning to a Driverless City: Evaluating a Hybrid System for Autonomous and Non-Autonomous
Vehicles, 107 SIMULATION MODELING PRAC. & THEORY 102210, 2021, at 1, 1 (simulating “a system
of autonomous vehicles co-existing with human-driven vehicles” that “consists of a network of arterial
roads with exclusive lanes for autonomous vehicles where they can travel in platoons”).
78. See Roberto Baldwin, Michigan Envisions Autonomous-Car Lane from Detroit to Ann Arbor, CAR
& DRIVER (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a33607287/michigan-autonomouscar-highway-planned/ [https://perma.cc/S7TD-PFZ5]; Jordyn Grzelewski & Daniel Howes, Detroitto-Ann Arbor Self-Driving Vehicle Corridor Aims for National Leadership, DETROIT NEWS (Aug. 13, 2020,
6:52 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/mobility/2020/08/13/detroit-ann-arbor
-self-driving-vehicle-corridor-moving-ahead/3364205001/ [https://perma.cc/YSC8-ZXAM].
79. See, e.g., Gongyuan Lu, Yu (Marco) Nie, Xiaobo Liu & Denghui Li, Trajectory-Based Traffic
Management Inside an Autonomous Vehicle Zone, 120 TRANSP. RSCH. PART B 76, 77 (2019).
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Interstate 5 between Seattle and Vancouver to self-driving cars by 2040.80 The
needs and preferences of autonomous vehicle consumers, who are initially most
likely to be in wealthier and more educated communities, could guide the
locations to and from which exclusive smart lanes or highways and roads travel.
* * *
In sum, evidence from transportation data, market research, and history
indicate that structural inequalities along the lines of race and class will create
barriers that inhibit the most overpoliced and marginalized populations in our
current driving regime from owning and accessing autonomous vehicles. This
Article now turns to explore how those trends could exacerbate race- and classbased injustices involving traffic enforcement and policing against the
conventional vehicles that remain on the road in the advent of autonomous
vehicles.
II. FUNDAMENTAL SHIFTS IN POLICE REGULATION OF TRAFFIC
This part explores how the growth of autonomous vehicles could engender
fundamental shifts in the police regulation of traffic that worsen race- and classbased injustices in the traffic space. To lay the groundwork for these points,
Section II.A explores how autonomous vehicles are expected to avoid many
types of traffic violations, including those that are most heavily policed today.
Building on that analysis, Section II.B examines how traffic enforcement and
policing during traffic stops will more sharply focus on conventional vehicles
that remain on the road in a mixed-traffic regime. Section II.C then explores
how the spatial and geographic boundaries of where police enforce traffic laws
could also shift. As discussed, these changes would further erode racial and
economic fairness and equality in traffic enforcement and policing against
conventional vehicles in a mixed-traffic regime.
A.

Autonomous Vehicles and Conventional Traffic Laws

Autonomous vehicles are expected to avoid many types of traffic law
violations, including those that are most heavily policed and enforced today.81
The analysis below first evaluates the capability of autonomous vehicles to avoid
moving violations (for instance, speeding, failing to stop at a stop sign, and

80. MADRONA VENTURE GRP., CONVERT I-5 INTO AN AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE CORRIDOR 3
(2017), https://www.madrona.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/MVG-I5-Proposal-Digital.pdf [https
://perma.cc/C5NP-Z4QP] (“We propose that by 2040, at the latest, all of I-5 be completely
autonomous, and no human-driven cars be allowed on the highway.”).
81. See infra Section II.A.1.

100 N.C. L. REV. 327 (2022)

2022]TRAFFIC POLICING IN THE AGE OF AUTOMATED DRIVING 345
failure to signal before turning).82 It then turns to discuss nonmoving violations
(for instance, driver’s license and registration violations).83
1. Moving Violations
Autonomous vehicles will have the capability to avoid many types of
moving violations. Autonomous vehicles are expected to be programmed to
follow traffic rules (for example, speed limits) and real-time mapping will
enable the vehicles to obey traffic signals (for example, stop lights and stop
signs).84 Sensory technology and network connectivity systems will prevent
autonomous vehicles from tailgating or coming into contact with other
vehicles.85 In addition, people who are intoxicated will be able to travel in
autonomous vehicles without posing a public safety risk from driving under the
influence.86
The ability of autonomous vehicles to avoid moving violations is
important given the centrality of moving violations in traffic enforcement
today. To illustrate these points, consider multiyear statewide traffic stop data
from the state of Connecticut. As part of its Racial Profiling Prohibition
Project, Connecticut collects, maintains, and provides public access to annual

82. See infra Section II.A.1.
83. See infra Section II.A.2.
84. Robert B. Kelley & Mark D. Johnson, Defining a Stable, Protected and Secure Spectrum
Environment for Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1271, 1279 (2012) (“Autonomous
vehicles rely on GPS to provide real-time, dynamic location and mapping information.”); Harry
Surden & Mary-Anne Williams, Technological Opacity, Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars, 38
CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 138–40 (2016) (discussing digital mapping in autonomous vehicles).
85. Surden & Williams, supra note 84, at 137–38 (2016) (discussing sensory technology in
autonomous vehicles); Woods, supra note 16, at 86 (“A key feature of autonomous vehicles is that builtin sensors will largely prevent collisions with other vehicles or people.”).
86. Leon Booth, Richard Norman & Simone Pettigrew, The Potential Effects of Autonomous Vehicles
on Alcohol Consumption and Drink-Driving Behaviours, 39 DRUG & ALCOHOL REV. 604, 605–06 (2020)
(reporting results from an Australian study that “[c]onsistent with previous research . . . autonomous
vehicles could reduce drink-driving rates as almost half of the respondents indicated they would be
likely to use autonomous vehicles after drinking”); Frank Douma & Sarah Aue Palodichuk, Criminal
Liability Issues Created by Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1157, 1163 (2012) (“The
possibility of removing drunk drivers from the road is one of the most prominent benefits autonomous
vehicles might provide.”); Jeffrey K. Gurney, Driving into the Unknown: Examining the Crossroads of
Criminal Law and Autonomous Vehicles, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 393, 422 (2015) (arguing that if
an autonomous vehicle is capable of taking an intoxicated occupant home, “no punishment purposes
are served by ticketing the operator for driving under the influence of alcohol”); Katherine L. Hanna,
Old Laws, New Tricks: Drunk Driving and Autonomous Vehicles, 55 JURIMETRICS 275, 282 (2015) (“A
level-4 car would basically function as a personal chauffeured vehicle taking the occupants to the bar
and back to the house, parking itself appropriately, and perhaps even shuttling other people around
while the occupants are in the bar.”); Steven Van Uytsel & Danilo Vasconcellos Vargas, Challenges for
and with Autonomous Vehicles: An Introduction, in AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 1, 2 (Steven Van Uytsel &
Danilo Vasconcellos Vargas eds., 2020) (“What is for sure, autonomous vehicles will have the potential
to eliminate drunk driving or driving with fatigue.”).
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traffic stop data from all law enforcement departments across the state.87 Unlike
most publicly available statewide traffic stop data, the Connecticut data tracks
the underlying traffic violations that led to each stop.88
Table 1 below aggregates and presents data on the underlying traffic
violations for the 2,117,951 traffic stops that officers conducted in Connecticut
between 2016 and 2019 (the four most recent complete years of data).89 The
data reveal that moving (non-seatbelt) violations accounted for approximately
two in every three (66.37%) traffic stops in Connecticut. Common examples
included speeding, not obeying a traffic control signal, and stop sign
violations.90

87. Connecticut Traffic Stop Data, CT DATA COLLABORATIVE, http://trafficstops.ctdata.org/
[https://perma.cc/T74A-BG34].
88. Id. (datasets are available by clicking on “Download Data” and then “[d]ownload full datasets
for all police departments in Connecticut” at the bottom of the page). The underlying traffic violation
is listed under the “ReasonForStop” field in each annual database. Fifteen reasons for the stops were
recorded in the databases: window tint, unlicensed operation, traffic control signal, stop sign, STC
(state traffic commission violations), speed related, seatbelt, registration, other, moving violation,
equipment violation, display of plates, defective lights, cell phone, and administrative offense. For
simplicity purposes, I then reclassified these fifteen bases into the following violation categories:
moving (non-seatbelt), paperwork (non-license)/plates, equipment, administrative offense, license,
seatbelt, other, and visibility.
89. Id. Datasets are available for October 2015–September 2016, October 2016–December 2017,
January 2018–December 2018, and January 2019–December 2019. 2020 data are not yet available. Stops
conducted between October 2015 and December 2015 were omitted from the analysis above.
Connecticut officers conducted 512,697 traffic stops in 2019, 508,361 traffic stops in 2018, 663,855 stops
between October 2016 and December 2017, and 433,038 stops between January 2016 and September
2016. Id.
90. See infra note 91 (listing moving violations). In addition to the presented data from
Connecticut, older surveys also illustrate the centrality of moving violations in traffic enforcement.
See, e.g., Joh, Discretionless Policing, supra note 25, at 222 tbl.1 & n.146 (presenting data from a 2002
survey conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics showing that 54% of traffic stops evaluated in the
study involved speeding alone).
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Table 1. Traffic Stops in Connecticut by Underlying Traffic Violation,
2016–2019
Traffic Violation Type

Frequency

Percent

Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Paperwork (Non-License)/Plates92
Equipment93
Other
Seatbelt
Administrative Offense94
Visibility95
License
Total

1,405,760
263,132
196,406
105,675
69,554
38,971
25,729
12,724
2,117,951

66.37
12.42
9.27
4.99
3.28
1.84
1.22
0.60
100.00

91

Traffic citation data (as opposed to traffic stop data) provide another angle
to see the centrality of moving violations in current traffic enforcement. Here,
traffic citation data from New York State are instructive. As part of its open
data initiative, New York State recently released a comprehensive database of
tickets on file with the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles.96
Importantly, the database tracks the underlying traffic violation for each issued
traffic ticket.97
Table 2 below aggregates and presents the relevant data on the underlying
traffic violations for the 14,163,404 traffic tickets issued in New York State
between 2013 and 2017 (the four most recent complete years of data). The data

91. Connecticut Traffic Stop Data, supra note 87. This included speeding (596,145 stops), cell phone
violations (183,202 stops), general moving violations (165,306 stops), ignoring a traffic control signal
(148,875 stops), stop sign violations (153,067 stops), and state traffic commission violations (159,165
stops). Id.
92. Id. This included registration violations (202,867 stops) and display of plates violations
(60,265 stops). Id.
93. Id. This included defective lights (191,842 stops) and general equipment violations (4,564
stops). Id.
94. Id. The administrative offenses were a mix of license and registration violations.
95. Id. This included window tint violations.
96. Traffic Stops Issued: Four Year Window, N.Y. ST., https://data.ny.gov/Transportation/ TrafficTickets-Issued-Four-Year-Window/q4hy-kbtf [https://perma.cc/53WY-E6MU].
97. To see a visualization of the frequencies of each traffic violation type, see id., click “Create
Visualization” under “Table Preview” and select “Violation Description” in the “Dimension” search
field. That visualization displays the number of traffic tickets issued for the top 200 traffic violations
in the state. I then reclassified those 200 traffic violations into the following violation categories:
moving (non-seatbelt), paperwork (non-license)/plate, equipment, license, seatbelt, other, unclear,
visibility, and bicycle/pedestrian.
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reveal that moving (non-seatbelt) violations accounted for over half (53.46%)
of the traffic tickets issued in the state.
Table 2. Traffic Citations Issued in New York State by Reason for
Citation, 2013–2017
Traffic Violation Type

Frequency

Percent

Moving (Non-Seatbelt)98
Paperwork (Non-License)/Plate99
Equipment100
License101
Seatbelt102
Other103
Unclear104
Visibility105
Bicycle/Pedestrian
Total

7,571,547
2,010,313
1,883,322
1,289,387
703,735
332,528
70,255
182,963
119,354
14,163,404

53.46
14.19
13.30
9.10
4.97
2.35
0.50
1.29
0.84
100.00

2. Nonmoving Violations
Whether autonomous vehicles will be capable of avoiding or
circumventing laws involving nonmoving violations (for instance, driver’s
license violations, equipment violations, and visibility violations) is also
possible, but more uncertain.106
Some experts and commentators predict that autonomous vehicles could
spawn major changes to driver’s license laws.107 The basic idea is that if human

98. See infra Appendix.
99. See infra Appendix.
100. See infra Appendix.
101. See infra Appendix.
102. See infra Appendix.
103. See infra Appendix.
104. See infra Appendix. Unclear violations included citations for document violations, but it was
unclear whether the document involved a driver’s license or another document.
105. See infra Appendix.
106. Woods, supra note 16, at 86.
107. See, e.g., Ronald C. Fisher, Government Expenditure Implications of Autonomous Vehicles, 73
NAT’L TAX J. 235, 247 (2020) (“Use of autonomous vehicles may require a different form of license or
none at all.”); Doug Newcomb, You Won’t Need a Driver’s License by 2040, WIRED (Sept. 17, 2012,
1:42 PM), https://www.wired.com/2012/09/ieee-autonomous-2040 [https://perma.cc/KH32-8TFZ]
(speculating that autonomous vehicles may lead to the disappearance of driver licensing); David C.
Schwebel, Child/Adolescent Development and Autonomous Vehicle Operation: “Operator’s Licenses” Instead of
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drivers are not required to take control of autonomous vehicles, then there is no
public safety need to require a driver’s license.108 Several states have already
enacted legislation that exempts operators of fully autonomous vehicles from
driver’s license requirements or allows fully autonomous vehicles to drive on
the road without a human operator.109
Scholars and researchers further describe how significant reductions in
traffic accidents and the removal of human error from driving could eliminate
the need for autonomous vehicle drivers to purchase auto insurance.110 Some
experts expect that the purchase price of autonomous vehicles will subsume
standard insurance costs as liability for accidents shifts away from autonomous
vehicle owners to auto manufacturers.111 If autonomous vehicle owners do not
need to purchase auto insurance, then traffic laws requiring drivers to be able
to provide proof of insurance may no longer apply to autonomous vehicle
occupants.
Driver’s Licenses, 10 J. INJ. & VIOLENCE RSCH. 61, 61 (2018) (“What we today call ‘driver’s licenses’
may soon become outdated artifacts . . . .”).
108. Woods, supra note 16, at 88–89.
109. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.85(1) (Westlaw through laws and joint resolutions in effect
from the 2021 1st Reg. Sess. and Spec. “A” Sess. of the 27th Leg.) (“Notwithstanding any other law, a
licensed human operator is not required to operate a fully autonomous vehicle . . . .”); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 40-5-21(a)(13) (LEXIS through 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) (exempting from license
requirement “a fully autonomous vehicle with the automated driving system engaged or the operator
of a fully autonomous vehicle with the automated driving system engaged”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-3302 (LEXIS through all Acts of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 107th Leg. (2021), and all Acts of the
1st Spec. Sess. of the 107th Leg. (2021)) (“A driverless-capable vehicle may operate on the public roads
of this state without a conventional human driver physically present in the vehicle . . . .”); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-401(a) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-162 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.)
(“[T]he operator of a fully autonomous vehicle with the automated driving system engaged is not
required to be licensed to operate a motor vehicle.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-01-01.2.3 (LEXIS
through end of the 2021 67th Legis. Assemb.) (“An autonomous vehicle with automated driving
systems engaged does not require a human driver to operate on the public highway if the autonomous
vehicle is capable of achieving a minimal risk condition.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482A.200 (LEXIS
through Chapters 1–32, 34–41, 43–52, 54–59, 62–76, 78–154, 156–159, 161–170, 173–178, 180–187, 189–
228, 230–237, 239–243, 245–276, 278, 279, 283–285, 287, 288, 290–330, 332–346, 348–362, 364–368,
371, 377–382, 384, 373, 374, 389–397, 399–407, 411, 413, 414, 416–418, 420–422, 424–443, 444–474,
476, 477, 480–489, 491, 493–496, 498–501, 503, 507–510, 512, 514–516, 518, 523, 524, 526–529, 531–
544, 546, 550, 551, and 557 of the 81st Reg. Sess. (2021)) (“No motor vehicle laws or traffic laws of this
State shall be construed to require a human driver to operate a fully autonomous vehicle which is being
operated by an automated driving system.”).
110. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles, supra note 15, at 1616 (“As autonomous vehicles
become more common on the roadways, the substantial reduction in the number of crashes will
substantially decrease both the cost of and need for personal auto insurance.”); Lynne McChristian &
Richard Corbett, Regulatory Issues Related to Autonomous Vehicles, 35 J. INS. REGUL. 1, 10 (2016)
(hypothesizing that “the shift in liability from the driver to the automaker or manufacturer of the AV
[autonomous vehicle] technology raises the probability that insurance becomes a standard feature, part
of the purchase price of a self-driving vehicle”).
111. McChristian & Corbett, supra note 110, at 10. For a general overview of different liability
regimes for autonomous vehicles, see Steven Van Uytsel, Different Liability Regimes for Autonomous
Vehicles: One Preferable Above the Other?, in AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES, supra note 86, at 67–92.

100 N.C. L. REV. 327 (2022)

350

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

Visibility violations designed to ensure that human drivers can adequately
control conventional vehicles (for instance, window tints or obstructed
windshield views) may also be deemed unnecessary for autonomous vehicles.112
This is especially the case if autonomous vehicles are equipped with sensors,
network connectivity systems, and infrared and laser lighting systems that fully
function in severe weather conditions.113
* * *
The promise of autonomous vehicles to avoid traffic violations and traffic
accidents has been largely discussed through the lens of traffic safety.114 On one
hand, these traffic safety benefits are directly relevant to police work given that
accident investigations are a major component of police work today.115 Motor
vehicle accidents are also the leading cause of accidental death for on-duty law
enforcement officers in the United States.116 On the other hand, the issue of
whether the traffic safety benefits of autonomous vehicles will come at the cost
112. Jeff Daniel Clark, Driverless Cars and Criminal Justice Resource Allocation, 22 SMU SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 195, 208 (2019) (“Laws regulating window tinting are aimed at ensuring driver
visibility, but those laws would be unnecessary for driverless cars.”).
113. See John R. Quain, These High-Tech Sensors May Be the Key to Autonomous Cars, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/26/business/autonomous-cars-sensors.html [https
://perma.cc/PY4Y-FVF3 (dark archive)] (discussing infrared and laser lighting systems); Anthony
Cuthbertson, Reinventing the Seatbelt for the Self-Driving Era, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 19, 2019, 12:34 PM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/features/self-driving-cars-safety-volvo360c-seat-belt-autonomous-a8991301.html [https://perma.cc/U7UD-MWQZ] (discussing possibilities
for autonomous vehicles to use color and sound to communicate with conventional vehicles).
114. See, e.g., Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles, supra note 15, at 1615 (discussing the
expected traffic safety benefits of autonomous vehicles); see also DANIEL SPERLING, THREE
REVOLUTIONS: STEERING AUTOMATED, SHARED, AND ELECTRIC VEHICLES TO A BETTER
FUTURE 82 (2018) (“The most certain clear-cut benefit of both self-driving and driverless vehicles is
safety. Fully automated cars will be much safer than those with human drivers.”); Pearl, supra note 11,
at 1842 (“Enhanced motor vehicle safety . . . is overwhelmingly the largest benefit that autonomous
vehicles stand to offer.”). Relevant to this point, the National Highway and Traffic Safety
Administration estimates that 94% of serious traffic accidents are attributable to human error, such as
distraction, sleep deprivation, and intoxication. Surden & Williams, supra note 84, at 128.
115. See GARY W. CORDNER, POLICE ADMINISTRATION 72 (9th ed. 2016) (“The traffic task
includes several subtasks relating to different police activities vis-à-vis motor vehicles. These subtasks
include intersection control (traffic direction), traffic law enforcement, parking law enforcement, and
traffic accident investigation.”); Jay L. Zagorsky, Cops May Feel the Biggest Impact from Driverless Car
Revolution, CONVERSATION (Mar. 16, 2015, 5:39 AM), https://theconversation.com/cops-may-feelbiggest-impact-from-driverless-car-revolution-38767 [https://perma.cc/6746-9569] (noting that “much
of [police officers’] actual day-to-day work involves enforcing traffic rules and responding to
accidents”).
116. For instance, according to the most recent available data from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, of the forty-one officers accidentally killed in the line of duty in 2019, nineteen officers
were killed in motor vehicle crashes and sixteen were pedestrian officers struck by vehicles. See Table
65, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted: Type of Accident and Activity of Victim Officer, 2015–
2019, FBI, https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2019/tables/table-65.xls [https://perma.cc/A8TZ-KFNT]; see also
Tom LaTourrette, Risk Factors for Injury in Law Enforcement Officer Vehicle Crashes, 38 POLICING 478,
478 (2015) (studying risks that on-duty police officers face from traffic accidents).
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of exacerbating policing harms to civilians in the traffic space has been less of a
focus in scholarly and policy conversations. The next sections now turn to
examine those issues.
B.

Conventional Vehicles and Increased Risk of Police Contact Through Traffic
Enforcement

If police retain their current role in traffic enforcement in the advent of
autonomous vehicles, then officers will continue to conduct traffic stops on
vehicles that violate the rules of the road. With the ability to avoid many types
of traffic violations, autonomous vehicles will be naturally shielded from the
bulk of traffic law enforcement.117 As a result, traffic enforcement will gradually
and more acutely target conventional vehicles that cannot automatically avoid
traffic violations, and moving violations in particular. As autonomous vehicles
become more ubiquitous, the number of potential vehicles to stop and issue
citations for traffic violations will decline.118
These shifts are a cause for concern given that state and local governments
rely heavily on traffic ticket revenue and fines and fees from traffic cases to
fund their respective budgets.119 Pressure to make up for losses in traffic ticket
revenue could provide a major incentive for more targeted and aggressive traffic
enforcement against conventional vehicles that cannot avoid traffic violations,
especially moving violations.120 Lending support to this idea, studies show that

117. Of course, this does not mean that autonomous vehicles or their occupants will not be policed
at all. See sources cited supra notes 37–38.
118. Clark, supra note 112, at 202 (noting that “traffic stops and citations for traffic law infractions
will be vanishingly rare” in the advent of autonomous vehicles); Kevin Davis, Preparing for a Future with
Autonomous Vehicles, POLICE CHIEF MAG. (2016), https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/preparingfor-a-future-with-autonomous-vehicles/ [https://perma.cc/BGP9-MCAV] (noting the “significant
reduction in traffic stops and related citations” in the advent of autonomous vehicles).
119. Beth A. Colgan, Beyond Graduation: Economic Sanctions and Structural Reform, 69 DUKE L.J.
1529, 1552–53 (2020) (“[R]esearchers have linked increased traffic ticketing to both budgetary shortfalls
and statutory limitations on other mechanisms for generating revenue such as property tax caps.”);
Thomas A. Garrett & Gary A. Wagner, Red Ink in the Rearview Mirror: Local Fiscal Conditions and the
Issuance of Traffic Tickets, 52 J.L. & ECON. 71, 71 (2009) (concluding based on results from an empirical
study that “tickets are used as a revenue-generation tool rather than solely a means to increase public
safety”).
120. See Gregory M. Stein, The Impact of Autonomous Vehicles on Urban Land Use Patterns, 48 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 193, 203 (2021) (noting that “fines for traffic violations . . . will dry up” in the advent
of autonomous vehicles); Selika Josiah Talbot, The Political Economy of Autonomous Vehicles, FORBES
(June 23, 2020, 7:51 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/selikajosiahtalbott/2020/06/23/the-politicaleconomy-of-autonomous-vehicles/#162fdcee1555 [https://perma.cc/9CUH-UDEE (dark archive)]
(“Given that autonomous vehicles are programmed to obey traffic laws and comply with regulations of
operating on the roadways, what will offset the loss of millions of dollars of vehicle infraction violation
fees that many cities use to plug the holes in their budgets?”).
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traffic ticketing practices increase at times when municipal tax revenues are
lower or in times of municipal fiscal distress.121
Lower-income people, and especially lower-income people of color, are
already targeted and harmed the most by aggressive traffic enforcement
practices. Traffic debt traps many low-income people, and especially lowincome people of color, in a vicious cycle of poverty and criminal justice
involvement.122 For many people living in poverty, the cost of a single traffic
ticket is beyond their living means.123 Unpaid traffic debt and failure to appear
in court for a traffic ticket can result in hundreds of dollars of additional
financial penalties, loss of a driver’s license, garnished wages, and even
incarceration.124
The growth of autonomous vehicles, however, could exacerbate race- and
class-based injustices that stem from police regulation of traffic in other
nuanced ways. For instance, vehicle condition is a common proxy that officers
use to identify “suspicious activity.”125 When used as a proxy in this fashion,
121. See, e.g., Garrett & Wagner, supra note 119, at 86 (finding that “negative changes in local
revenue from the previous fiscal year are significantly correlated with the change in the number of
tickets issued”); Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, More Tickets, Fewer Accidents: How CashStrapped Towns Make for Safer Roads, 54 J.L. & ECON. 863, 865 (2011) (“When towns are in fiscal
distress, government officials have an incentive to seek extra revenues not only through an increase in
property taxes but also by increasing fines. One potential source of fines is traffic tickets.”).
122. Emily Reina Dindial & Ronald J. Lampard, Opinion, When a Traffic Ticket Costs $13,000, N.Y.
TIMES (May 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/27/opinion/drivers-license-suspensionfees.html [https://perma.cc/Y85R-T387 (dark archive)] (“The criminal justice system too often
produces a self-perpetuating cycle, particularly for the poorest people, who can’t pay fines or hire
lawyers to make charges go away.”); Veryl Pow, Comment, Rebellious Social Movement Lawyering Against
Traffic Court Debt, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1770, 1774 (2017) (“[T]he failure to pay off traffic court debt can
result in arrest and incarceration . . . .”).
123. See ALEX BENDER, STEPHAN BINGHAM, MARI CASTALDI, ELISA DELLA PIANA,
MEREDITH DESAUTELS, MICHAEL HERALD, ENDRIA RICHARDSON, JESSE STOUT & THERESA
ZHEN, NOT JUST A FERGUSON PROBLEM: HOW TRAFFIC COURTS DRIVE INEQUALITY IN
CALIFORNIA 6 (2015), https://lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/Not-Just-a-Ferguson-Problem-HowTraffic-Courts-Drive-Inequality-in-California-4.20.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FCL-4SEW] (“As the
fees have gone up . . . fewer people can afford to pay their tickets.”).
124. William E. Crozier & Brandon L. Garrett, Driven to Failure: An Empirical Analysis of Driver’s
License Suspension in North Carolina, 69 DUKE L.J. 1585, 1587 (2020) (“A suspended license can result
in negative consequences ranging from job loss, to restricted career opportunities, to limited mobility,
to name a few.”); Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and
International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 271 (2011) (“[U]npaid parking tickets may be enforced through
the garnishment of wages.”); BENDER ET AL., supra note 123, at 6 (discussing the various hardships
people living in poverty can suffer when their driver’s licenses are suspended for inability to pay a
traffic ticket or failure to appear in traffic court).
125. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 692 (1996) (involving an officer who asserted
that “older model, two-door General Motors cars are a favorite with drug couriers because it is easy to
hide things in them”); United States v. Madrigal, 626 F. App’x 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2015) (involving an
officer who “relied on the fact that [the defendant] drove an older and recently registered truck in
creating suspicion because many drug couriers use such vehicles”); United States v. De La Cruz-Tapia
162 F.3d 1275, 1278 (10th Cir. 1998) (involving an officer who testified that “[o]lder model vehicles
like this one are consistent with the trend toward illegal aliens and drug trafficking”); United States v.
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vehicle condition can give effect to officers’ subjective and biased judgments
about the social positions and assumed criminality of vehicle occupants.126
Scholars describe that officer judgments about “suspicious activity” are often
intertwined with improper race- and class-based assumptions.127 In a mixedtraffic regime, officers could use conventional vehicles, and especially older
conventional vehicles, as proxies that give even stronger effect to these
improper assumptions.
With the growth of autonomous vehicles, racial disparities for moving
violations could also emerge in localities or become more pronounced in areas
where those disparities already exist. Some studies have found lower degrees of
racial disparity for traffic stops initiated on black and white drivers for moving
violations compared to nonmoving violations in certain localities.128 In
explaining these differences, researchers have argued that moving violations are
less prone to discretionary and pretextual stops.129 For instance, officers might
not be able to observe a driver’s race or other personal characteristics when

Salinas, 940 F.2d 392, 393–94 (9th Cir. 1991) (involving an officer who “noticed that the vehicle was
an older model with a large trunk and passenger area which, in his experience, was of a type commonly
used for drug and alien smuggling”); United States v. Payano, No. 17-238, 2017 WL 11466349, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2017) (involving an officer who testified “that the Ford Focus was an older model
and that ‘drug trafficking organizations commonly use vehicles that are 10 to 15 years old’”).
126. Megan Welsh, Joshua Chanin & Stuart Henry, Complex Colorblindness in Police Processes and
Practices, 68 SOC. PROBS. 374, 386–87 (2021) (discussing connections between racial profiling and the
use of older vehicles as a proxy for assumed drug criminality).
127. For a comprehensive discussion of the “suspicion heuristic,” see L. Song Richardson & Phillip
Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 296–314 (2012). See also
Carbado, supra note 1, at 152–53 (discussing connections between “racial suspicion” and traffic stops
for criminal investigatory purposes).
128. See, e.g., Travis L. Dixon, Terry L. Schell, Howard Giles & Kristin L. Drogos, The Influence
of Race in Police-Civilian Interactions: A Content Analysis of Videotaped Interactions Taken During Cincinnati
Police Stops, 58 J. COMM. 530, 539 (2008) (presenting study findings showing that “a lower proportion
of the stops of Black drivers occurred due to moving violations”); ALEXANDER WEISS & DENNIS P.
ROSENBAUM, UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI. CTR. FOR RSCH. IN L. & JUST., ILLINOIS TRAFFIC STOPS
STATISTICS STUDY: 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2009), http://www.idot.illinois.gov/assets/uploads/
files/transportation-system/reports/safety/traffic-stop-studies/2008/2008%20illinois%20traffic%20sto
p%20summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FHP-GF6X] (finding that Caucasian drivers were more likely
to be stopped for a moving violation than minority drivers (73.91% of Caucasian vs. 68.19% of
minority)); POLICING PROJECT, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF L., AN ASSESSMENT OF TRAFFIC STOPS AND
POLICING STRATEGIES IN NASHVILLE 7 (2018) [hereinafter POLICING PROJECT], https://www.
nashville.gov/Portals/0/SiteContent/MayorsOffice/docs/reports/policing-project-nashville-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WQ2W-AAZ3] (presenting study findings showing that “[r]acial disparities are
notably higher for non-moving violation stops than for moving violations”).
129. Kirk Miller, Race, Driving, and Police Organization: Modeling Moving and Nonmoving Traffic
Stops with Citizen Self-Reports of Driving Practices, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 564, 566 (2009) (“Moving
violations, and especially speeding, are less prone to the dynamics that contribute to police use of traffic
violations as a pretext to stop and question drivers . . . .”).
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vehicles are driving at high speeds or at night time until after a traffic stop is
initiated.130
Even if officers cannot see a driver when vehicles are driving at nighttime
or at high speeds, the capability of autonomous vehicles to avoid moving
violations will systematically shield autonomous vehicle occupants from those
types of stops.131 As previously discussed, several indicators from transportation
data and market research suggest that the most overpoliced and overcriminalized populations in today’s driving regime—namely, lower-income
people and especially lower-income people of color—will face greater barriers
to autonomous vehicle ownership and access.132 Assume, for the sake of
argument, that officers have less discretion in initiating moving violation stops.
That lack of discretion could now work to further harm marginalized and overpoliced communities in a mixed-traffic regime by giving effect to structural
race- and class-based inequalities that guide who can and cannot own or access
autonomous vehicles.
In addition, the growth of autonomous vehicles could exacerbate
pretextual traffic stops based on nonmoving violations. Studies show that
people of color are more likely to be stopped for nonmoving violations (for
instance, equipment or registration violations) compared to white drivers.133
Racial disparities involving traffic stops for nonmoving violations are especially
high in lower-income neighborhoods with higher crime rates and where the
majority of the resident population consists of people of color.134 Scholars have
argued that these trends lend support to the idea that officers commonly use
130. Id. (“Moving stops, and especially speeding stops, are less likely to be pretextual because
drivers are obscured by a somewhat analogous blur of speed and/or movement, which should likewise
limit officer perception of driver features, including race.”); Pierson et al., supra note 3, at 736 (“We
found that black drivers were less likely to be stopped after sunset, when a ‘veil of darkness’ masks
one’s race, suggesting bias in stop decisions.”). Researchers Jeffrey Gogger and Greg Ridgeway coined
this phenomenon as the “veil of darkness” hypothesis. See Jeffrey Gogger & Greg Ridgeway, Testing
for Racial Profiling in Traffic Stops from Behind a Veil of Darkness, 101 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 878, 878 (2006)
(“Our approach is based on a simple assumption: During the night, police have greater difficulty
observing the race of a suspect before they actually make a stop.”).
131. See supra Part II.
132. See supra Part II.
133. See, e.g., Dixon et al., supra note 128, at 539 (finding that “[t]he likelihood of being stopped
for a nonmoving violation (e.g., expired registration) was twice as high for Black drivers as for White
drivers”); POLICING PROJECT, supra note 128, at 7 (finding that the “per capita stop rate was 44%
higher for black drivers than for white drivers”).
134. POLICING PROJECT, supra note 128, at 8 (finding based on a study of the Nashville Police
Department that “Nashville officers do make more non-moving violation stops in high crime
neighborhoods, regardless of their racial composition”); Alex Chohlas-Wood, Sharad Goel, Amy
Shoemaker & Ravi Shroff, AN ANALYSIS OF THE METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE POLICE
DEPARTMENT’S TRAFFIC STOP PRACTICES 4 (2018), https://policylab.stanford.edu/media/nashvilletraffic-stops.pdf [https://perma.cc/UGK3-5TEX] (“[T]he racial disparities in non-moving violation
stops are at least partly attributable to such stops being made in high-crime areas—which, in Nashville,
tend to be predominantly black.”).
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nonmoving violations as pretexts to investigate nontraffic crime.135 The highly
discretionary nature of traffic stops based on nonmoving violations enables
these pretextual practices.136
If autonomous vehicles are capable of avoiding or can circumvent traffic
laws that pertain to certain nonmoving violations (for instance, driver’s license
and visibility violations), then autonomous vehicle occupants will be
automatically shielded from stops based on those violations as well.137 Given
their highly discretionary nature, pretextual traffic stops based on nonmoving
violations could become even more targeted against drivers and passengers in
conventional vehicles.138 Current statistical trends indicate that people of color
in lower-income neighborhoods with higher crime rates would be especially
vulnerable to these more acute pretextual traffic stop practices.139
C.

The Spatial and Geographic Boundaries of Traffic Enforcement and Policing

The growth of autonomous vehicles could also engender changes in the
spatial and geographic boundaries of where traffic violations are enforced and
policed. Legal scholars and criminologists have argued that trends involving
policing and crime cannot be separated from the neighborhoods and localities
in which those phenomena occur.140 Related to this point, discrimination along
the lines of race and class manifest both spatially and geographically.141

135. Miller, supra note 129, at 567 (noting that “nonmoving traffic violations, such as vehicle
equipment, licensing and registration, and insurance violation are more commonly used as pretext to
conduct a traffic stop”); Kenneth J. Novak, Disparity and Racial Profiling in Traffic Enforcement, 7 POLICE
Q. 65, 86 (2004) (presenting study findings showing that “officers may be using equipment violations
(for all races) as a pretext for investigative stops”).
136. Miller, supra note 129, at 567 (“[N]onmoving traffic violations are more prone to the
discretionary processes of officer decision-making.”).
137. See supra Part I.
138. See Miller, supra note 129, at 567.
139. See sources cited supra note 134.
140. See, e.g., DAVID WEISBURD, ELIZABETH R. GROFF & SUE-MING YANG, THE
CRIMINOLOGY OF PLACE: STREET SEGMENTS AND OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE CRIME
PROBLEM 3–28 (2012) (describing “criminology of place” as criminological approach); Monica C. Bell,
Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 650, 687–728 (2020) [hereinafter Bell, Anti-Segregation
Policing] (discussing mechanism of pro-segregation policing); I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and
Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 68 (2009) [hereinafter Capers, Policing, Race, and Place]
(discussing connections between policing, race, and place); Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.KENT L. REV. 669, 669 (1998).
141. See Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, supra note 140, at 659–87 (discussing the persistence of
residential segregation in the United States); Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, supra note 140, at 44
(“Spatial separateness allows social relationships to be structured along racial lines, which in turn has
the effect of perpetuating and reinforcing social and economic inequality.”).
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Traffic stops play an important role in reinforcing those boundaries.142 For
instance, law enforcement officers use traffic stops as a way to stop and search
“suspicious persons” who are perceived as “not belonging” or “out of place” in
particular neighborhoods or areas.143 Those judgments, which can be held by
officers as well as community residents, are often intertwined with racialized
and class-based assumptions involving criminality.144
Consider the possibility that autonomous vehicles first become
mainstream in affluent or middle-class neighborhoods, especially in light of the
previously discussed trends involving autonomous vehicle access and demand.145
Officers and residents could use conventional vehicles, especially older
conventional vehicles, as a proxy to support racialized suspicions about who
“belongs” or seems “out-of-place” in those neighborhoods.146 The expansive
nature of traffic codes makes it relatively easy for officers to use a traffic
violation as a pretext to pull over a conventional vehicle and ask drivers where
they came from and where they are going.147
142. See Tim Bates & David Fasenfest, Enforcement Mechanisms Discouraging Black-American
Presence in Suburban Detroit, 29 INT’L J. URB. & REG’L RSCH. 960, 960 (2005) (discussing evidence of
more aggressive traffic policing on black drivers in suburban neighborhoods).
143. See Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, supra note 140, at 70 (identifying traffic laws as “[a]nother
set of laws [that] facilitates the disproportionate targeting of minorities and others deemed out of
place”); Harris, supra note 1, at 559 (“In the event that we see a suspicious automobile or occupant and
wish to search the person or the car, or both, we will usually follow the vehicle until the driver makes
a technical violation of a traffic law.”); Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish:
Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1844–45 (2004) (noting
that traffic stops allow police to stop “suspicious travelers”); Kenneth J. Novak & Mitchell B. Chamlin,
Racial Threat, Suspicion, and Police Behavior: The Impact of Race and Place in Traffic Enforcement, 58
CRIME & DELINQ. 275, 275 (2012) (presenting study findings supporting the conclusion that “social
control increases among groups whose racial characteristics are inconsistent with the neighborhood
racial composition”).
144. See Carbado, supra note 1, at 152–53 (discussing connections between “racial suspicion” and
traffic stops for criminal investigatory purposes); Leo Carroll & M. Lilliana Gonzalez, Out of Place:
Racial Stereotypes and the Ecology of Frisks and Searches Following Traffic Stops, 51 J. RSCH. CRIME &
DELINQ. 559, 559–60 (2014) (presenting findings on a study involving traffic stops showing that
“[b]iased policing is largely the product of implicit stereotypes that are activated in contexts which
Black drivers appear out of place and in police actions that require quick decisions providing little time
to monitor cognitions”); see also Richardson & Goff, supra note 127, at 296–314 (discussing the
suspicion heuristic in policing). Here, it is important to acknowledge that recent studies have found
that White drivers are not subjected to equal police scrutiny involving out-of-place policing compared
to Black drivers. See Lance Hannon, Malik Neal & Alex R. Gustafson, Out-of-Place and In-Place
Policing: An Examination of Traffic Stops in Racially Segregated Philadelphia, 67 CRIME & DELINQ. 868,
868 (2021) (presenting study results showing that “in place or out of place, being seen as White is
always an advantage in Philadelphia”).
145. See supra Part I.
146. See, e.g., Bates & Fasenfest, supra note 142, at 969 (presenting study findings showing that “it
is on streets where black motorists were rare that they attracted the most attention of the Eastpointe
police”).
147. See Harris, supra note 1, at 559 (noting the “true scope of traffic codes” and “the limitless
opportunities they give police to make pretextual stops”); Joh, Discretionless Policing, supra note 25, at
210 (“[T]he vehicle code provides an officer with any reason to stop virtually anyone.”). For a more
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As autonomous vehicles become more ubiquitous on highways and roads,
the spatial and geographic areas where traffic is policed could also shift in ways
that exacerbate aggressive traffic enforcement and pretextual traffic stops.148 For
instance, if autonomous vehicles become mainstream in more affluent and
middle-class communities, then law enforcement agencies could strategically
place traffic patrol in neighborhoods or on roads that are known to have higher
traffic flows of conventional vehicles. In turn, patrol officers could sharpen their
focus on traffic enforcement against conventional vehicles as pretexts to pursue
broader crime-control agendas in designated “high crime areas” with greater
concentrations of people of color.149 Officers could also use conventional
vehicles as a proxy to amplify current practices of stopping and ticketing drivers
who are travelling to and from localities that are known to have higher
concentrations of racially and economically marginalized populations.150
The direction of new autonomous vehicle infrastructure is also relevant.
New highways and roads exclusively designed for autonomous vehicles151 would
spatially and physically separate autonomous vehicles from traffic patrol
officers looking to enforce traffic violations. Alternatively, if autonomous
vehicles are given exclusive lanes on highways and roads, then traffic patrol
could focus their attention on driving lanes that only include conventional
vehicles.152 Officers could then use conventional vehicles as a direct or indirect
proxy to stop and ticket drivers and passengers from racially and economically
marginalized populations at higher rates.153
* * *
comprehensive analysis of intrusions stemming from police questioning of motorists during traffic
stops, see Jeannine Bell, The Violence of Nosy Questions, 100 B.U. L. REV. 935 (2020).
148. See Novak, supra note 135, at 69 (“[P]atterns of organizational deployment may contribute to
differential traffic stops of minorities.”).
149. See, e.g., Roh & Robinson, supra note 3, at 137 (presenting study findings “imply[ing] that
racial disparity at the level of individual stops may be substantially explained by differential policing
strategies adopted for different areas based on who resides in those areas”); see also James E. Wright II,
Dongfang Gaozhao & Meagan A. Snow, Place Plus Race Effects in Bureaucratic Discretionary Power: An
Analysis of Residential Segregation and Police Stop Decisions, 44 PUB. PERFORMANCE & MGMT. REV. 352,
352 (2020) (presenting findings of traffic enforcement in Minneapolis, Minnesota, finding that
“majority African American areas of high segregation have 40% more vehicle or person searches than
other parts of the city”).
150. In this regard, autonomous vehicles could amplify existing police practices of directed patrol.
See Christopher Barnum & Robert L. Perfetti, Race-Sensitive Choices by Police Officers in Traffic Stop
Encounters, 13 POLICE Q. 180, 185 (2010) (“Directed patrol is a police deployment technique that
increases the odds the police will come into contact with minority members. This can result from
geographic, temporal, or organizational factors.”).
151. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing “smart” highways for autonomous
vehicles).
152. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing reserving exclusive lanes on roads and
highways for autonomous vehicles).
153. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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In sum, autonomous vehicles are likely to narrow the universe of vehicles
that commit traffic violations and, in turn, transform the spatial and geographic
boundaries of where traffic laws are enforced in a mixed-traffic regime. In so
doing, autonomous vehicles could give rise to new layers of problems involving
pretextual traffic stops and aggressive traffic policing against drivers and
passengers in conventional vehicles. Most at risk are communities of color and
other marginalized groups that are vulnerable to overpolicing and
overcriminalization in today’s driving regime. Having developed these points,
the remainder of this Article considers possibilities for reform.
III. REFORMS
This part explores potential law and policy reforms for achieving racial
and economic justice in traffic enforcement and policing against drivers and
passengers in conventional vehicles in a mixed-traffic regime. Section III.A
examines police reforms. Section III.B focuses on transportation law and policy.
A.

Policing

The new challenges that autonomous vehicles pose for fairness and
equality in the traffic domain are not simply repeats of today’s problems.
Rather, autonomous vehicles could add layers of structural unfairness and
inequality into the police regulation of traffic by enabling a growing number of
vehicle owners and users from more privileged positions of race and class to be
shielded from police enforcement of traffic laws.154
As a first step, organized efforts to collect and disseminate data on traffic
stops as a means to curb racial profiling must consider how the introduction of
autonomous vehicles affects racial profiling and disparities in the traffic space.
Currently, approximately twenty states have laws that are intended to address
racial profiling through data collection and dissemination.155 Data collected
under these statewide initiatives, as well as local efforts in states that do not
have such laws, must provide enough information to allow researchers to
identify and study changes in traffic policing patterns as autonomous vehicles
become increasingly mainstream.

154. See supra Part II.
155. See It’s Time To Start Collecting Stop Data: A Case for Comprehensive Statewide Legislation,
POLICING PROJECT (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.policingproject.org/news-main/2019/9/27/its-timeto-start-collecting-stop-data-a-case-for-comprehensive-statewide-legislation [https://perma.cc/5MD4XYVZ] (“Currently there are 19 states that (for the most part) mandate collection of data on every law
enforcement initiated traffic stop . . . .”); State Trends in Law Enforcement Legislation: 2014–2017, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminaljustice/state-trends-in-law-enforcement-legislation-2014-2017.aspx [https://perma.cc/2DXQ-T8BF]
(“At least 21 states collect demographic information for person’s whose vehicles are stopped by
police.”).
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Policing scholars and researchers might have to develop new empirical
models and methods to track those changes. Here, the federal government could
play an important role by awarding grants for scholars and researchers to pursue
this line of research.156 Already, the National Institute of Justice has awarded
grants for researchers to identify and combat vulnerabilities of autonomous
vehicle computer systems to cyber threats and to host workshops on the public
safety scenarios that law enforcement officers will likely face in the advent of
autonomous vehicles.157
Beyond data collection and dissemination, deeper structural reforms that
reorient the role of police in the traffic space will be even more important in
the advent of autonomous vehicles. If piecemeal constitutional or statutory
interventions are inadequate to tackle persistent race- and class-based injustices
in today’s driving system,158 then we can only expect that those approaches will
be even less effective to tackle these new challenges on the horizon. Legal
scholars have already identified a need to rethink police involvement in routine
traffic enforcement and have advanced specific ideas for reform.159 These calls
are part of a broader growing scholarly and public conversation about the proper
role of police and concerns about the vast scope of the police function.160
In other work, I propose removing police from routine traffic
enforcement.161 Under that proposal, jurisdictions would create and redelegate
the bulk of traffic enforcement to newly created public, nonpolice agencies

156. For instance, the National Institute of Justice (“NIJ”), a wing of the U.S. Department of
Justice, “awards grants and cooperative agreements for various research, development, and evaluation
projects; and fellowship programs.” Funding & Awards, NAT’L INST. JUST. (June 17, 2019),
https://nij.ojp.gov/funding [https://perma.cc/9N6F-DUS4].
157. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL & U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 9, at 16.
158. Scholars have described how Fourth Amendment protections in traffic stop contexts have
become diluted over time. See David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment’s Death on the
Highway, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556, 556 (1998) (“Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that in cases
involving cars, the Fourth Amendment is all but dead.”). For a comprehensive analysis of the dilution
of Fourth Amendment protections on roads and highways, see generally LaFave, supra note 143; Lewis
R. Katz, “Lonesome Road”: Driving Without the Fourth Amendment, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1413 (2013).
159. See, e.g., Joh, Discretionless Policing, supra note 25, at 216 (discussing automating traffic
enforcement); SARAH A. SEO, DATA FOR PROGRESS, THE JUST. COLLABORATIVE INST., A PATH
TO NON-POLICE ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS 5 (2020), https://tjcinstitute.com/
wp-content/uploads/2020/09/non-police-enforcement-of-civil-traffic-violations.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3MSU-7TGM] (discussing non-police enforcement of civil traffic violations); Jordan Blair Woods,
Traffic Without the Police, 73 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1471 (2021); Ekow N. Yankah, Pretext and Justification:
Republicanism, Policing, and Race, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1543, 1625–28 (2019) (discussing the separation
of removing traffic monitoring powers from traditional police powers).
160. See, e.g., ALEX S. VITALE, THE END OF POLICING 27 (2017) (“[W]hat we really need is to
rethink the role of police in society.”); Barry Friedman, Disaggregating the Policing Function, 169 U. PA.
L. REV. 925, 926 (2021).
161. Woods, supra note 159, at 1477.
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(called “traffic agencies”).162 Traffic agencies would operate wholly
independently of the police and hire their own public employees (called “traffic
monitors”) to conduct and oversee routine traffic enforcement. Traffic monitors
would enforce traffic laws through in-person traffic stops and handle all aspects
of traffic enforcement that jurisdictions decide to automate.163
The push for reforms to remove police from traffic enforcement has also
grown in the wake of protests and social mobilization against police violence.164
For instance, in July 2020, the City of Berkeley, California, voted in favor of a
proposal that would be the first in the country to remove police from conducting
traffic stops as part of a comprehensive plan to reimagine public safety.165 The
proposal directs the city to create a Department of Transportation staffed by
unarmed civil servants who would be in charge of enforcing traffic laws.166
Other jurisdictions have recently enacted reforms that limit policeinitiated traffic stops for certain driving offenses without going so far as to
create new public agencies to handle traffic enforcement. For instance, in 2020,
the Commonwealth of Virginia passed a new law that prohibits officers from
conducting traffic stops based on various low-level equipment violations
including faulty lighting, defective equipment, window tints, and noisy exhaust
systems.167 The Virginia law seeks to eliminate racial profiling during traffic
stops.168 In another example, in 2021 the mayor of the City of Philadelphia
162. Id. at 1488–515 (developing a new framework for traffic enforcement that redelegates the bulk
of traffic enforcement tasks to nonpolice agencies).
163. To maximize the potential of these structural reforms to achieve fairness and equality in traffic
enforcement, the framework includes two additional law and policy reforms: (1) reevaluating the
breadth and imprecision of traffic codes so that traffic law and enforcement only focuses on driving
behaviors that pose an imminent public safety threat, and (2) reducing financial and professional
incentives that contribute to aggressive and biased traffic enforcement (namely, restructuring traffic
fines and fees systems and prohibiting traffic ticket issuances as a measure of professional performance).
Id. at 1479, 1507–15.
164. See, e.g., Julianne Cuba, Campaign To Remove NYPD from Traffic Enforcement Gains Steam,
STREETSBLOGNYC (June 25, 2020), https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2020/06/25/campaign-to-removenypd-from-traffic-enforcement-gains-steam/ [https://perma.cc/K8GU-75KV] (discussing efforts to
remove NYPD from traffic enforcement); Beverly White, Could Routine Traffic Stops Be Conducted
Without Armed Police Officers?, NBC L.A. (June 30, 2020, 11:54 PM), https://www.nbclosangeles.com/
news/local/could-routine-traffic-stops-be-conducted-without-lapd/2388942/ [https://perma.cc/B89KNLUF] (discussing proposal to have the Department of Transportation, and not police, handle traffic
stops in the city of Los Angeles).
165. Kellen Browning & Jill Cowan, How Berkeley Could Remove the Police from Traffic Stops, N.Y.
TIMES (July 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/us/berkeley-ca-police-departmentreform.html [https://perma.cc/F3LF-FG9Y (dark archive)]; Rachel Sandler, Berkeley Will Become 1st
U.S. City To Remove Police from Traffic Stops, FORBES (July 15, 2020, 8:22 PM), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/rachelsandler/2020/07/14/berkeley-may-become-1st-us-city-to-remove-police-from-trafficstops/#757f789970fa [https://perma.cc/T7TH-LMCE (dark archive)].
166. Browning & Cowan, supra note 165; Sandler, supra note 165.
167. H.B. 5058, 161st Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. I (Va. 2020).
168. Simone Weichselbaum, Emily R. Siegel & Andrew Blankstein, Police Face a ‘Crisis of Trust’
with Black Motorists. One State’s Surprising Policy May Help., NBC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2021, 5:00 AM),
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signed an executive order implementing the city’s recently passed “Driving
Equality” bill, which effectively bans police from making traffic stops based on
certain low-level traffic violations (called “secondary violations” under the new
law).169 Officers must observe a more serious driving offense (called “primary
violations” under the new law) to conduct a traffic stop and only then can they
issue a citation for a low-level traffic violation.170 Proponents hailed the new
legislation as an important step to reduce racial inequality and discrimination
during traffic stops in the city.171
Looking to the growth of autonomous vehicles for additional reasons to
reevaluate the role of police in the traffic space also makes sense given the
history behind why police first became involved in traffic enforcement.
Professor Sarah Seo’s historical work illustrates how police became involved in
traffic law enforcement a century ago with the rise of the mass production of
the automobile.172 Until then, movement on highways and roads was largely
self-regulated.173 As fast-moving cars became more common on highways and
roads, self-regulation was no longer a desirable or feasible approach for
maintaining traffic safety.174 Seo explains that public opinion shifted to view
bad driving, especially when it resulted in serious injuries, as a threat to general
public safety.175 In turn, governments expanded traffic codes with new moving
and nonmoving traffic violations (for instance, speeding and driver’s license
restrictions).176 The proliferation of traffic laws not only rendered anyone who
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/traffic-stops-are-flashpoint-policing-america-reformers-arewinning-big-n1280594 [https://perma.cc/7TPN-52QJ].
169. PHILADELPHIA CODE § 12-1703(3) (2021) (“[A] police officer or other law enforcement
officer may initiate a motor vehicle stop for a secondary violation observed within the City of
Philadelphia only where there is a simultaneously-observed primary violation for which an officer, at
their discretion, could issue a citation.”). “Secondary violations” include traffic violations involving
registration plate placement, lighting equipment, minor windshield obstructions, bumper damage, and
driving without proper registration or inspection certificates. Id. § 12-1702(2).
170. Id. § 1703(3).
171. Tim Stelloh, Philadelphia To Become First Big City in U.S. To Ban Minor Traffic Stops, NBC
NEWS (Nov. 1, 2021, 4:14 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/philadelphia-become-firstbig-city-u-s-ban-minor-traffic-n1282911 [https://perma.cc/WVY3-8K9T].
172. See generally SARAH A. SEO, POLICING THE OPEN ROAD: HOW CARS TRANSFORMED
AMERICAN FREEDOM (2019) (offering a comprehensive legal and historical analysis of how the mass
production and growth of the automobile had transformative effects on policing, criminal procedure,
and freedom in the United States).
173. Id. at 25 (“Even in the cities, the flow of movement on streets and highways was largely selfregulated.”).
174. Id. at 26 (“Nineteenth-century self-regulation was unsuited for the sudden influx of thousands
of fast-moving cars on the public roads.”).
175. Id. at 33 (“[T]he consensus view among laypeople was that bad driving afflicted the entire
motoring population.”); id. at 30 (“[M]any traffic violations, especially when they resulted in tragedy,
did incite righteous outrage.”).
176. Id. at 26 (“Local governments responded swiftly by enacting laws and more laws. In addition
to speed limits and license requirements, new regulations mandated safety equipment, like nonglaring
headlights, rearview mirrors.”).
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drove a motor vehicle a potential lawbreaker, but also invited increased reliance
on the police to enforce those laws.177 Police involvement in the traffic domain
expanded over time, and the relationship between traffic and criminal law
enforcement became more pronounced.178
As autonomous vehicles become more ubiquitous, an increasing number
of vehicles will be capable of avoiding traffic violations and motor vehicle
crashes.179 Consequently, the public safety concerns that initially justified
creating and maintaining a large role for police in traffic enforcement will
increasingly lose force with the growth of autonomous vehicles. As those
justifications lose force, however, police regulation of traffic could more acutely
and unfairly target the very populations that are already overpoliced and
overcriminalized in the traffic space.180 Unpacking these competing currents
reveals why structural police reforms in the area of traffic enforcement will be
even more necessary in a mixed-traffic regime where autonomous vehicles and
conventional vehicles share the road.
B.

Transportation Law and Policy

The growth of autonomous vehicles also prompts novel questions about
how transportation law and policy could be used in a mixed driving regime to
address gaps that render conventional vehicle occupants at greater risk of police
contact through traffic enforcement. As explained below, there are several
possible directions that these law and policy innovations could take. These
innovations will be especially important if police retain their current role in
traffic enforcement vis-à-vis conventional vehicles in a mixed-traffic regime.
Starting from the assumption that private ownership will be a popular
model of autonomous vehicle ownership, one possible future approach is to
accelerate the growth of privately-owned autonomous vehicles by making the
technology more affordable to individual consumers through government
investment.181 Without proactive government intervention, higher-income
177. Id. at 27 (“The proliferation of traffic laws turned everyone who drove a car into a
lawbreaker.”); id. at 58 (“When such laws lacked in inherent moral force compelling obedience, and
when efforts to endow those laws with a moral obligation to obey proved inadequate, reliance on the
police appeared to be the only option left.”).
178. Id. at 109 (“As crime became more mobile, traffic and criminal law enforcement began to
overlap.”).
179. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles, supra note 15, at 1616 (noting “the substantial
reduction in the number of crashes” as “autonomous vehicles become more common on the roadways”).
180. See supra Part II.
181. Donald G. Gifford, Technological Triggers to Tort Revolutions: Steam Locomotives, Autonomous
Vehicles, and Accident Compensation, 11 J. TORT L. 71, 140 (2018) (“Society may legitimately decide that
because of the extremely significant overall improvement in safety resulting from autonomous vehicles
and other positive aspects of autonomous vehicles, the development of the autonomous-vehicle
technology should be subsidized.”); Luo et al., supra note 48, at 226 (discussing the sensibility of
“provid[ing] subsidies to promote the early adoption of AVs”). Related to this point, researchers have
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households, especially in car-dependent areas, will be in the strongest position
to enjoy early access to autonomous vehicles and reap the benefits of reduced
police contact through traffic enforcement.182 To address these problems,
government subsidies could be employed in ways that make autonomous
vehicles more accessible in lower-income communities, especially in cardependent areas with higher concentrations of minority populations that are
overpoliced and overcriminalized in the traffic space.
Subsidies could also be used to create new programs that encourage lowerincome households to trade in older, conventional vehicles for newer,
autonomous vehicles.183 Prior automobile subsidy programs offer a possible
starting point. When car sales dropped dramatically after the financial crisis in
2008, the federal government instituted the Car Allowance Rebate System (also
known as “cash for clunkers”).184 The program allocated $3 billion to help
stimulate new car sales and to encourage consumers to trade in their older
vehicles and purchase newer, more fuel efficient vehicles.185 Depending on the
type of car purchased and the difference in fuel efficiency between the older
and newer vehicle, consumers received between $3,500 and $4,500 credit in the
form of a voucher or reduced purchase price from new car dealers.186 To
stimulate the growth of autonomous vehicles, the federal government could
institute a similar program that offers owners of conventional vehicles a
substantial credit in the form of a voucher or reduced purchase price to buy
newer, autonomous vehicles.187

argued for creating consumer subsidies to make autonomous taxi services more affordable for lowincome people. See Ashley Nunes, Sam Harper & Kristen D. Hernandez, The Price Isn’t Right:
Autonomous Vehicles, Public Health, and Social Justice, 110 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 796, 797 (2020)
(advocating for “creat[ing] consumer subsidies for low-income individuals using autonomous taxi
services”). Here, it is important to recognize that some legal scholars have critiqued the use of law to
subsidize driving. See, e.g., Gregory H. Shill, Should Law Subsidize Driving?, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 498,
577 (2020) (stressing that “[r]ules from virtually every field of law that codify subsidies for driving,
including dangerous driving, should be repealed”).
181. See supra Part II.
182. See supra Part II.
183. See Abbott, supra note 30, at 32–33.
184. TED GAYER & EMILY PARKER, CASH FOR CLUNKERS: AN EVALUATION OF THE CAR
ALLOWANCE REBATE SYSTEM 1–2 (2013), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
cash_for_clunkers_evaluation_paper_gayer.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4CW-UFBU]. It is important to
note that scholars and commentators have critiqued the effectiveness of the “cash for clunkers”
program. See id. at 12; see also Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, The Effects of Fiscal Stimulus: Evidence from the
2009 Cash for Clunkers Program, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1107, 1108 (2012). To be clear, I am merely discussing
the program here as an example that offers a useful starting point for designing subsidy programs that
make autonomous vehicles more affordable to conventional vehicle users. I am not arguing that
autonomous vehicle subsidy programs should be exact mirrors of the “cash for clunkers” program.
185. GAYER & PARKER, supra note 184, at 2.
186. Id.
187. Abbott, supra note 30, at 32–33.
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The previous analysis illustrated why narrowing gaps in ownership and
access to privately-owned autonomous vehicles along the lines of race and class
can engender important equality benefits for traffic enforcement and policing.
There are other potential benefits to this acceleration, however, that do not
immediately involve policing and traffic stops. For instance, scholars and
researchers describe that the full spectrum of societal benefits that autonomous
vehicles can offer will only be realized if there are a sufficient number of
autonomous vehicles on the road.188 One estimate suggests that motor vehicle
accidents cost the U.S. economy over $340 billion each year in economic costs
(for instance, increased insurance premiums, medical costs, loss of work and
income, and legal costs) and noneconomic costs (for instance, death and
injuries).189 It further estimated that fully replacing conventional vehicles with
autonomous vehicles would save the U.S. economy over $306 billion each
year.190
In the nearer term, government subsidies could also be used to narrow
gaps between autonomous and conventional vehicles in their capabilities of
avoiding traffic violations.191 For instance, subsides could encourage auto
manufacturers to build active safety systems or driver-assistance systems into
newer conventional vehicles at affordable prices. Those improvements would
increase the capabilities of newer conventional vehicles to avoid committing
traffic violations as society progresses towards autonomous vehicles and older,
conventional vehicles phase out. In turn, there would be fewer opportunities
for police to initiate traffic stops on conventional vehicles as society transitioned
into a mixed-traffic regime.
One example that illustrates how a move in this direction is possible in the
near-term comes from the $1 trillion infrastructure bill that President Biden
recently signed into law (the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act).192 The
Act includes a number of provisions to improve vehicle safety, including a
mandate that could go into effect by 2025 requiring auto manufacturers to equip
188. Aaron Edelmann, Stefan Stümper & Tibor Petzoldt, Cross-Cultural Differences in the
Acceptance of Decisions of Automated Vehicles, 92 APPLIED ERGONOMICS 103346, Jan. 2021, at 1, 1
(noting that “AVs [automated vehicles] have to be attractive and widely accepted” in order to fulfill
their expectations “to bring upon many benefits”); Luo et al., supra note 48, at 226 (“[A]fter there are
a sufficient number of such vehicles in the traffic stream, many benefits can be realized.”).
189. Driverless Cars Set To Save World Economies Billions—World Study, GLOB. POSITIONING
SPECIALISTS, https://www.gps.com.au/fleet-management-solutions/driverless-cars-set-to-save-worldeconomies-billions-world-study [https://perma.cc/NG2K-U4K8].
190. Id.
191. See Yong Liu, Bing-ting Quan, Qian Xu & Jeffrey Yi-Lin Forrest, Corporate Social
Responsibility and Decision Analysis in a Supply Chain Through Government Subsidy, 208 J. CLEANER
PROD. 436, 437 (2019) (“Government efforts to direct business behaviors toward certain socially
desirable outcomes take a variety of forms and approaches. One approach that has been gathering
substantial support in recent years is to provide subsidies.”).
192. H.R. 3684, 117th Cong. (2021) (enacted).
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new vehicles with “advanced drunk and impaired driving prevention
technology.”193 The congressional findings in support of the mandate stress the
frequency of alcohol-impaired driving fatalities and the economic costs that
stem from alcohol-impaired driving.194 Under the Act, qualifying technology
includes, but is not limited to, systems that can passively monitor driving
behaviors to identify impairment and “prevent or limit motor vehicle operation
if an impairment is detected.”195 In line with this vision, several auto
manufacturers are already installing infrared cameras in vehicles that track
driver attentiveness and intervene with semiautomated driver-assist systems
(including hazard lights, speed reduction, and halting or pulling over the
vehicle) when warning driving behaviors are detected.196
One criticism of using government investment to accelerate the growth of
privately-owned autonomous vehicles focuses on the potentially negative
environmental implications of encouraging this model of autonomous vehicle
ownership. Although more research is needed, researchers argue that one of the
most promising potential environmental benefits of automated driving
technology is its ability to move transportation systems away from heavy
reliance on privately owned vehicles.197 From this perspective, rather than
encouraging the growth of privately owned autonomous vehicles, government
investment could be used instead to expand access to reliable public
transportation or affordable car sharing services, especially in car-dependent
areas with higher concentrations of minority populations that are over-policed
and over-criminalized in the traffic space.
Calls for expanding access to reliable public transportation services are far
from new. For instance, transportation scholars and advocates have long
stressed that reliable public transportation is essential for many low-income
people, particularly in rural and car-dependent areas, to access jobs, health care,
education, and other vital aspects of everyday life.198 They have also identified
various factors that inhibit access to public transportation in rural and other cardependent areas, including lack of government investment, travel time,
weather, supply constraints, and costs.199
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. § 24220(c).
Id. § 24220(a).
Id. § 24220(b)(1)(A)(ii).
Eleonor Segura, Your Next Car Could Include Newly Required Drunk Driving Prevention Tech,
MOTORTREND (Nov. 11, 2021), https://www.motortrend.com/news/anti-drunk-driving-technologymandated-infrastructure-bill/ [https://perma.cc/RL7S-QQ9J] (“General Motors, BMW, and Nissan
have already started installing infrared cameras that monitor driver behavior. These cameras track
driver attentiveness and use semi-automatic driver-assist systems.”).
197. Morteza Taiebat, Austin L. Brown, Hannah R. Safford, Shen Qu & Ming Xu, A Review on
Energy, Environmental, and Sustainability Implications of Connected and Automated Vehicles, 52 ENV’T SCI.
& TECH. 11449, 11450, 11460 (2018).
198. Jill Hough & Ali Rahim Talequani, Future of Rural Transit, 21 J. PUB. TRANSP. 31, 34 (2018).
199. Id. at 36.
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If the growth of privately-owned autonomous vehicles exacerbates raceand class-based injustices in conventional traffic policing, then those injustices
might add new layers to ongoing law and policy conversations about the need
for expanding reliable public transportation choices within communities,
especially in rural and other car-dependent areas. Here, technology could hold
promise. For instance, government investment could bolster efforts to integrate
automated technology within public transit systems to narrow access gaps in
rural and other car-dependent areas.200 Moving in this direction, however,
requires stakeholders to have a broader point-of-view than merely equating
“smart” public transportation with urban public transportation in the future.201
CONCLUSION
Although many questions remain open about the direction of autonomous
vehicle technology, it is almost certain that when autonomous vehicles are
available for purchase on the market, they will share the road with conventional,
human-controlled vehicles for some period of time.202 This Article offered a
detailed portrait of the potentially negative systemic effects of autonomous
vehicles on racial and economic justice in traffic enforcement and policing
against conventional vehicles that remain on the road in a mixed-traffic regime.
The analysis made an important descriptive contribution to the scholarly
literature by drawing on multiple sources (transportation data, market research,
and historical evidence) to explain why the growth of autonomous vehicles
could give rise to new layers of problems involving pretextual traffic stops and
aggressive traffic policing against conventional vehicles. Most at risk are people
of color and other marginalized communities that are already over-policed and
over-criminalized in today’s driving regime. To address these challenges on the
horizon, this Article normatively illustrated why values of fairness and equality
200. Jonas Meyer, Henrik Becker, Patrick M. Bösch & Kay W. Axhausen, Autonomous Vehicles: The
Next Jump in Accessibilities?, 62 RSCH. TRANSP. ECON. 80, 90 (2017) (presenting study findings
predicting that rural public transportation can profit more from shared autonomous vehicle fleets than
urban areas); Jan Schlüter, Andreas Bossert, Phillipp Rössy & Moritz Kersting, Impact Assessment of
Autonomous Demand Responsive Transport as a Link Between Urban and Rural Areas, 39 RSCH. TRANSP.
BUS. & MGMT. 100613, 2021, at 1, 2 (“Technological progress might not only allow for a higher quality
of services in urban areas but also for an increase in the quantity of services provided outside the urban
core.”); see also Fredrik Pettersson & Jamil Khan, Smart Public Transport in Rural Areas: Prospects,
Challenges and Policy Needs, in SHAPING SMART MOBILITY FUTURES: GOVERNANCE AND POLICY
INSTRUMENTS IN TIMES OF SUSTAINABILITY TRANSITIONS 187, 194 (Alexander Paulson & Claus
Hedegaard Sorensen eds., 2020) (“Given that a significant share of the cost for current public
transportation services is allocated to labour, there is a theoretical potential that AVs [autonomous
vehicles] could reduce the cost of services in low demand contexts.”).
201. Sebastian Imhof, Jonas Frölicher & Widar von Arx, Shared Autonomous Vehicles in Rural Public
Transportation Systems, 83 RSCH. TRANSP. ECON. 100925, July 2020, at 1, 1 (noting that “studies on
the implementation of autonomous vehicles in the public and private transportation system show a
high concentration on urban areas”).
202. Abraham & Rabin, supra note 5, at 131.
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in policing must be considered ex ante and considered in the early design and
development of autonomous vehicles. This perspective strengthens existing
calls for reimagining public safety in the area of traffic enforcement and
underscores a need for law and policy reforms that specifically address racial
and economic justice in the advent of autonomous vehicles.
APPENDIX
The table below presents the types of violations and respective number of
citations for each traffic violation category included in the aggregated data for
the 14,163,404 traffic tickets issued in New York State between 2013 and 2017
(the four most recent complete years of data).203
Traffic Violation
Category
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)

Traffic Violation Type
SPEED IN ZONE
DISOBEYED TRAFFIC DEVICE
SPEED OVER 55 ZONE
OPERATING MV MOBILE
PHONE
FLD TO STOP AT STOP SIGN
SPEED IN ZONE 11-30
OPER MV WHILE USING
PORTABLE ELEC DEV
IMPROPER SIGNAL
IMPROPER TURN
MOVED FROM LANE
UNSAFELY/WEAVING
NYC REDLIGHT
FLD YIELD PEDEST NYC
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED
PASSED RED SIGNAL
FOLLOWING TOO CLOSELY
SPEED NOT REASONABLE AND
PRUDENT
DRIVING W/.08 OF 1 PERCENT
OF ALCO/BLD
SPD-UNPSTD 11-30 NYC
FAILED TO KEEP RIGHT
FLD DUE CARE FOR EMERG
VEH STOPPED OR STANDING
SPEEDING IN SCHOOL ZONE

203. See supra notes 96–105 and accompanying text.

Number of
Citations
1,438,817
1,047,136
650,177
515,308
441,460
429,316
364,126
221,879
166,059
160,823
156,595
143,968
127,334
121,860
96,835
83,347
74,979
71,856
58,381
53,036
49,431
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Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)

IMPROPER RIGHT TURN
INSUFF TURN SIGNAL-LESS
THAN 100 FEET
OPERATING OUT OF CLASS
DROVE ACROSS HAZARD
MARKING
IMPROPER OR UNSAFE
TURN/WITHOUT SIGNAL
SPEED IN ZONE 31+
NO STOPPING/STANDING/
PARKING ON HIGHWAY
CONSUMPTION/ALCOHOL IN
MOTOR VEHICLE
FAILED TO USE DESIGNATED
LANE
U-TRN BUSIN DIST NYC
IMPROPER LEFT TURN ON
TWO-WAY RDWY
FLD TO YLD RT-OF-WAY ON
LEFT TURN
BACKING UNSAFELY
SPEEDING IN POSTED WORK
ZONE
DRIVING TO LEFT OF
PAVEMENT MARKINGS
AGGRAVATED DWI - BLOOD
ALCOHOL CONTENT .18 OR
HIGH
DRIVING/WRONG DIRECTION
ON ONE-WAY STREET
IMPROPER U-TURN
FLD TO STOP SCHOOL BUS
IMPROPER LEFT TURN ON
ONE-WAY RDWY
FAILED TO TURN AS
REQUIRED
FLD TO YLD RT-OF-WAY TO
EMERGENCY VEHICLE
IMPROPER PASSING ON RIGHT
PASSED VEHICLE ON RIGHT
DRIVING ON
SHOULDER/LIMITED ACCESS
HGWY

[Vol. 100
47,536
46,410
42,883
42,655
42,018
37,962
36,296
34,059
34,042
31,815
30,572
27,803
27,181
26,909
26,616
26,133
25,855
25,409
25,064
22,112
19,116
18,511
16,493
16,038
15,508
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Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)

DRIVING W/ABILITY IMPAIRED
BY DRUGS
FLD TO YLD RT-OF-WAY AT
STOP SIGN
SPEED 11-30 OVR LMT
TRUCK RTE VIOLS NYC
FLD TO YLD RT-OF-WAY WHEN
ENTERING ROADWAY
FLD TO STOP ON A STEADY
RED ARROW
DISOBEYED TRAFFIC DEVICE HOV LANE
OPER MV/MC/BIC W/MORE 1
EARPHONE
RECKLESS DRIVING
SPEED IN ZONE 1-10
FLD TO YLD RT-OF-WAY TO
PEDESTRIAN ON SIDEWALK
SPEED-PSTD 11-30 NYC
OBSTRCT TRAFF LN NYC
FLD OBEY SIGNS-TBTA
FLD TO YLD RT-OF-WAY AT
INTERSECTION
UNREASONABLE
SPEED/SPECIAL HAZARDS
AVOIDING TRAF DEVICE OR
INTERSECTION
FAILED TO USE/IMPROPER USE
4-WAY FLASHERS
IMP USE BUS LANE NYC
OVERLOADED VEHICLE 3 OR
MORE AXLES
UNAUTHORIZED USE
RESTRICTED VEH ON PRKWYCOMM VEH
OBSTRUCTING INTERSECTION
INTERFERED W/ SAFE
OPERATION
SPD-UNPSTD 1-10 NYC
FLD YLD PED CROSSWLK
EVASION OF TOLL-TBTA
DROVE OFF PAVEMENT TO
PASS ON RIGHT

15,473
15,337
15,071
14,584
14,370
14,196
14,120
13,430
13,220
13,066
11,843
11,804
11,671
11,526
10,840
10,767
10,659
10,433
9,970
9,810
7,947
7,063
6,931
6,662
6,368
6,177
6,131
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Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Moving (Non-Seatbelt)
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate

RIDING MOTORCYCLE
BETWEEN LANES
DRIVING W/ABILITY
IMPAIRED/ALCOHOL
FLD YLD RT-OF-WAY/RT TRN
AT RED SIGNAL
DISOBEYED GRN ARROW
PASSED FLASHING RED LIGHT
OBST INTERSEC/CRSWLK
FAILED TO SIGNAL AS
REQUIRED
DRIVING TOO SLOW
DRIVING OVER DIVIDING
SPACE
DRIVING ON SIDEWALK
BACKING ON CONTROLLEDACCESS HGWY
AGG DWAI IMPAIRED COMB
DRUGS - DRUGS/ALCOHOL
AGG DWI - CHILD IN VEHICLE
UNINSPECTED MOTOR
VEHICLE
OPERATING W/O INSURANCE

[Vol. 100
5,727
5,145
5,002
4,793
4,620
4,415
4,250
3,757
3,545
3,402
3,400
3,158
3,145
665,010
409,102

UNREGISTERED MOTOR
VEHICLE
PLATE MISSING/
INSECURE/DIRTY
OPERATING REGISTRATION
SUSP/REVOKED
FLD/NOTIFY DMV CHANGE OF
ADDRESS
IMPROPER PLATES

284,280

UNREG VEH > 60 DAYS

32,122

FLD/SURR/LIC/REG
PLATES/REV-ART 7
FAILED TO PRODUCE
INSURANCE CARD
NO/IMPROPERLY AFFIXED REG
STICKER
OPER VEH W/O REG /
SUSPENDED OR REVOKED
DECAL

31,104

228,074
132,923
66,131
38,711

21,255
18,228
17,568
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Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Paperwork (NonLicense)/Plate
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment

UNREGISTERED TRAILER

15,836

UNINSPECTED GT 60DAY

11,116

FAILED TO CHANGE
ADDRESS/REG
PERMITTING OPERATION W/O
INSURANCE
FORGED/MUTILATED
INSPECTION CERT
PROVIDING INVALID
INSURANCE ID CARD
UNREGISTERED MOTORCYCLE

8,383

SWITCHED TRAILER PLATES

3,527

MISUSE OF
DEALER/TRANSPORTER
PLATES
NO MOTORCYCLE PLATE

3,306

SIDEWINGS/SIDEWINDOWS/N
ON/TRANSPARENT
NO/INADEQUATE HEADLAMPS
INADEQUATE OR NO STOP
LAMPS
NO/INSUFFICIENT TAIL LAMPS
NO/INADEQUATE PLATE
LAMPS
NO/INADEQUATE
MUFFLER/EXHAUST SYSTEM
INSUFF HEADLIGHTS
REAR SIDE WINDOWS
NON/TRANSPARENT
UNSAFE TIRE
LIGHTING/REFLECTOR
VIOLATION
INADEQUATE OR NO STOP
LAMP OR LAMPS
NO HEADLAMPS/INCLEMENT
WEATHER
UNLAWFUL SPEEDOMETER
FAILED TO DIM HEADLAMPS
NO/INADEQUATE
DIRECTIONAL SIGNALS

461,645

6,205
5,278
4,512
4,494

3,148

354,865
288,367
146,567
115,458
104,449
58,212
52,655
41,492
36,214
32,983
27,836
20,014
19,472
17,812
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Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
License
License
License
License
License
License
License
License
License
License

SAFETY REGULATION
VIOLATION
IMPROPER WIPERS
NO/ILLEGAL FRONT
WINDSHIELD
UNSAFE STARTING
EQUIPMENT
VIOLATION/INADEQUATE
BRAKES
OPERATE OUT OF IGNITION
INTLK RESTRICTION
UNAPPROVED/NO PROTECTIVE
HELMET MCY
UNAPPROVED/NO FACE
SHIELD/GOGGLES- MCY
UNAUTHORIZED
LIGHTS/IMPROPER COLOR
INADEQUATE/NO SPLASH
GUARDS
INADEQ/NO TRAFFIC HAZ
WARNING LIGHTS
INADEQUATE
STEERING/BRAKES/HORN
NO BACKUP LIGHTS
OPERATING W/NO OR
IMPROPER FRONT/REAR
BUMPER
UNLICENSED OPERATOR
AGGRAVATED UNLIC OPER
3RD MISD
UNLICENSED GT 60DAYS
AGGRAVATED UNLIC OPER 3
PLUS SUSPENSION
AGGRAVATED UNLIC OPER2ND DEG
OPER/PERMIT OPER/LIC/REG
REV-ART 7
OPERATING IN VIOLATION OF
RESTRICTIONS
AGGRAVATED UNLIC OPER 1ST
DEGREE
PERMITTING UNLICENSED
OPERATION
AGGRAVATED UNLIC OPER
2ND/PREV CONV

[Vol. 100
15,423
13,598
11,385
8,917
8,081
7,683
7,324
6,160
5,474
5,277
4,783
4,450
3,685
3,041
626,799
307,811
180,431
42,571
29,675
18,051
17,602
14,748
11,511
9,970
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License
License
License
License
License
License
Seatbelt
Seatbelt
Seatbelt
Seatbelt
Seatbelt
Seatbelt
Seatbelt
Seatbelt
Seatbelt
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other

AGGRAVATED UNLIC OPER2ND DEG-ALC
USE RENTED/LEASED/LOANED
VEH W/O INTERLOCK
FACILITATING AGGRAVATED
UNLIC OPER
FAILED TO PRODUCE LICENSE
AGGRAVATED UNLIC OPER
2ND MAND SUSP
OPER NON-SUPV FRONT SEAT
OCCUPNT-DJ/MJ/PERMIT
NO SEAT BELT ADULT
NO LAP/SHOULDER HARNESS
OR DJ VIO
BACK SEAT PASS AGE 4-7
NO/IMPROPER RESTRAINT
BACK SEAT PASS AGE 8-15
NO/IMPROPR SEAT BELT
BACK SEAT PASS LESS THAN 4
NO/IMP RESTRAINT
NO SEAT BELT PASS-VEH OPER
BY DJ
NO SAFETY-BELT EACH SEAT
POSITION-1968
NO CHILD RESTRAINT DEVICEUNDER 4
FRONT SEAT PASS AGE 8-15
NO/IMPROPR SEATBELT
MOTR CARRIER OPER VEH IN
VIOLATION OF SAFETY RULES
LEAVING/SCENE PROPERTY
DAMAGE ACCIDENT
REFUSAL TO TAKE BREATH
TEST
IMPROP TAXI PKUP NYC
FAILED TO COMPLY
W/LAWFUL ORDER
NO CMV ON PKWAY NYC
THREW/DEPOSITED
REFUSE/ETC HGWY
UNAUTHORIZED USE OF NONPASSENGER VEH- REGION 9
FAILED TO COVER LOOSE
CARGO
UNATTENDED VEHICLE

6,053
5,824
5,367
5,144
4,423
3,407
307,668
249,947
39,343
32,055
25,727
23,173
13,931
6,491
5,400
173,658
41,009
18,515
16,990
14,019
7,852
7,804
5,857
5,827
5,235
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Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Unclear
Unclear
Unclear
Visibility
Visibility
Visibility
Visibility
Visibility
Visibility

OVERWEIGHT ON REG SINGLE
VEHICLE
NO LOG BOOK
OVERLOAD ON CONSECUTIVE
AXLES
PASSENGER IN VEHICLE
LEAVING/SCENE PERSONAL
INJURY ACCIDENT
EXCESS WGHT GE 18000
UNREGISTERED ATV
IMPROPER TRANSPORTATION
OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
NO OVERWEIGHT/OVERSIZE
PERMIT
OVWGT 3/MORE AXL NYC
FLD PRESENT DOC -NYC
FLD/SURRENDER
SUSP/REVOKED/LIC OR REG
FAILURE TO PRODUCE
LICENSE OR REGISTRATION
DOCUMENTS
DRIVERS VIEW OBSTRUCTED
VISIBILITY DISTORTED
BROKEN/DISCOLORED GLASS
NO MIRROR/NO LEFTSIDE
VIEW MIRROR
FRONT WINDSHIELD
NON/TRANSPARENT
NO REAR OBJECT DETECTION
SYSTEM DELIVERY TRUCK
REAR WINDOW REFLECTIVE

[Vol. 100
4,978
4,198
4,053
3,697
3,554
3,222
3,102
3,079
2,971
2,908
37,981
22,909
9,365
105,938
46,703
10,938
10,254
5,414
3,716

